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Hideko Magara ( * ) 
The Conservative Evolution of Political Restructuring in 
Japan 
日owshould the decline of the Japan SociaJist Party (JSp) in 
recent years be explained? In analyzing the transformation of 
social democratic parties in advanced societies， H. Kitschelt 
described the JSP as a party heading for self-destruction. (1) 
Although we cannot see the JSP as a Social Democratic party， (2)
it is true that the JSP has been self-destructing and， above aU， 
dominated by internal hatred， judging from its record in the last 
several decades. The JSP changed its name in January 1996 to 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP). It nominally advocates the 
West-European type Social Democracy. Yet， its political and 
social impact had been trivialized because the party's move 
toward a basic policy shift had been too slow. (3) The change of 
the party name came so late that the party had completely lost . 
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timing. At a glance， the change of the party name from the 
Socialist Party to the Social Democratic Party seemed to be a 
European type transformation. Ironically， however， it has 
produced an utterly non司Europeanresult: no huge moderate 
leftist party would exist under the new majoritarian electoral 
system. 
West European Social Democracy has an indisputable 
performance. There has been a steadfast development of the 
welfare state attained through political exchange between the 
(4) social democratic governments and the trade unions， ，. and 
social consensus to such a pattern was consolidated. 
Nonetheless， itbecame necessary to reorganize the welfare state 
under a low-growth economy. West European Social Democratic 
parties are trying to transform themselves from traditional 
Fordist parties to more flexible post-Fordist parties beyond 
Social Democracy. In such a European trend， itis noteworthy 
that the PDS (Partito Democratico della S仰 stra)of Italy held the 
initiative of political restructuring by boldly shifting its basic 
policies (5) and realized a leftist-led coalition government after 
the April 1996 elections. (6) The backwardness of the JSP / SDP 
which did not officially adopt Social Democracy until 1996 seems 
to stand out when compared with the Italian counterpart PDS. 
As it has often been pointed out， patterns of post-Fordist 
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economic restructuring can be largely divided into two 
categories. The one is a conservative restructuring scenario in 
which capitalists and managers， who have regained their 
managerial discretion， freely discharge their employees. 
Unemployment increases， therefore， to bring on a new 
polarization of labor markets. (7) The other is a radical.liberal 
scenario in which labor unions， in cooperation with voluntary 
groups， try to avoid unemployment and fragmentation of workers 
by adopting a reduction of working hours and other measures. 
Recent developments in West European politics reflect such a 
confrontation concerning the direction of economic 
(8) restructuring. 
The JSP failed to catch the radical-liberal post-Fordist trend 
beyond Social Democracy and came along a non-European way in 
which it continued to be dependent on labor unions led by 
conservative leaders who sided with the conservative post-
Fordist economic restructuring advocated by capitalists. In the 
July 1995 Upper House election， the JSP visibly relied on unions: 
the 43.8% of the successful JSP candidates， and almost 80% of 
al the new successful candidates came from unions. (9) 
In retrospect， the presence of Doi Takako， who aimed at 
strengthening the JSP's ties with the citizens， was thought 
possibly to assist the JSP to a radical-liberal post-Fordist 
transformation by breaking the socialists' stalemate with the 
labor unions， who became more conservative during the 1980s， 
and so deprived the JSP from advocating Social Democracy. 
Doi's citizen-oriented project， however， collapsed because of its 
inability to secure cooperation from within a party that was 四
excessively dependent on unions. ノ、
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The pacc of Japan's politico-economic reform is too slow 
when compared with the dizziness of the paradigmatic shift in 
world politics. As O'Donncll and Schmittcr suggest， the regimes 
that have achieved a great economic success often miss the best 
time for reform. (JO) This was the case in Japan， too. Reforming a 
once-successful system requires a great deal of energy. The 
conservatives， in particular， have been hesitant about changing 
the system that provided them with grcat economic success and 
(11) consolidation of their hegemony. 
Among such conservative forces， Ozawa Ichiro， a key actor 
in Japan's political reform， tenaciously sought to destroy the 
traditional parties， the JSP as well as the LDP (Liberal 
Democratic Party) to which he himself belonged. One possible 
explanation fo1' his behavior is that a serics of political reforms 
resulted from the Japanese establishment's recognition of the 
limit of the LDP's politics and attempt to break such politics 
frol1 within the regil1e. The conservative scenario of Ozaw且
Ichi1'o， protagonist of Japan's political realignment， reflected a 
big contribution on the part of business leaders， as well as 
Oz剖，ya'sown ambitions. Thc leadcrs of the big enterprises， who 
wcre frustrated from the late 80s with the dullness of LDP's one 
party control of the government， thought that a conservative two 
party system would be more acceptable. What they hoped for 
was not the European type confrontation between two forces， i.e.， 
the Conservati ves versus the Social Democrats， but th巴
American type of confrontation between two conservative 
parties. They said，“A two party system with the radicals on one 
四 pole is not acceptable，" and “The American typc two 
ノ、
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conservative party systel1 is ideal. With the West European 
Social Democratic type， economic policies would be crush巴d."
(10) GuilJermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. TrlωIsiti01! to 
De糊仰の PoliticalLife after Aut加ritarianRule. Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
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More concretely， they hoped for a two party system with the 
Liberal Democratic mainstream on one pole and some part of the 
LDP， the Komeito (the Clean Government Party)， thεDSP (the 
Democratic Socialist Party) plus rightist socialists on the other 
They also agreed to the electoral reform on the basis of a 
majoritarian system. At the same time， business leaders strongly 
requested administrative reform and thorough deregulation. 
Recognizing the inappropriateness of ]apan's traditional 
institutions in the international politico司economiccontext in post-
Cold War era， they fully realized the sheer necessity of 
reorganizing ]apan's political and economic order on a global but 
conservative basis. Thus， political reform was indispensable in 
order to realize a politics strong enough to cope with such a 
(12) cnsls. 
Unlike the ltalian case， ]apan's political reform resulted in a 
fatal fiasco for the left. One reason can be found in a strategic 
failure of the ]SP and the Rengo (]apanese Trade Union 
Confederation). The ]SP and Yamagishi Akira， President of the 
Rengo， tried to break the LDP's one party control of the 
government and create a government altεrnation with a slogan 
called “political reform". Such an intention itself was not entirely 
out of focus. In Italy， too， citizens wanted to bring an end to the 
coalition governments of the DC and， of course， realize political 
alternation. Both ]apan's Socialist Party and ltaly's Communist 
Party recognized the crisis of their steady electoral decline since 
the end of the 1970s and waited for a chance for recovery. It 
was quite natural that both of them tried to ovεrcome such a 
crisis and to expand their own power by enacting government 四
alternation when the conservative parties' scandals and ?主3 
C∞orr叫命
however， was that it never tried to hold the initiative for change 
throughout the process of political reform. Rengo's president 
(12) Watanabe Osamu. 1994. Seiji Kaikaku 10 Kenpo Kaisei: Nakasone 
Yasuhiro kara Ozawa Ichiro e. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten p. 405-418. 
Yamagishi barely held such an initiative at the very beginning of 
the reform. Nonetheless， he could not obtain consensus for his 
project not only from the JSP but also from his conservative 
colleagues within the Rengo. His project， thus， went in a different 
direction from his own original Social Democratic idea. 
In 1989， the year of the Berlin Wall's breakdown， the JSP's 
electoral triumph led by Doi Takako seemed to raise the 
possibility of practicing radical liberal politics. The JSP quickly 
missed their big opportunity， however， since it became 
conservative exactly when it should have boldly marched 
forward. When the Japanese electorate wanted a new politics 
corresponding to post-Fordist social changes， the Socialist Left 
too easily relied on conventional values and political 
expressions. On the other hand， the Socialist Right lost its raison 
d'etre by falling into line with the conservative ideology 
advocated by the labor unions in the private sector. Owing to 
the lack of the JSP's self-reforming ability， radical liberalism， 
which was growing in Western Europe， was nipped in the bud in 
Japan. Thereafter， Japan's political realignment showed simply a 
conservative evolution. 
Doi Takako's Civil-Liberalism and the Limit of the JSP 
Despite addressing the New Declaration of 1986， the JSP 
suffered a crushing defeat at the July 1986 elections. The 
number of its seats dropped from 112 to 85. Did the New 
Declaration seem out.of-date to the voters? Or， did the defeat 
stem from a simple lag in time? In any case， voters' support for 
四 theJSP drastically declined. One of the most serious problems 
六 with the JSP was the absence of powerful leaders. One 
宍 commentatorsaid:“The party does not seem to have a good staf. 
We cannot see any great leaders， candidates or othe'r leaders 
from outside. It looks like a party that is hard to approach. Is 
(13) Nishio Takaaki. 1987. “Nagare 0 kaeru soshiki-ron 0." Gekkan 
Shakaito， 87/8， p.119. 
the party so unappealing? (13) " The JSP actually lacked 
leadership， since it had never tried to produce leaders from 
し(14)inside its own ranks. 
In such a context， the emεrgence of Doi Takako as the new 
party leader succeeding Ishibashi Seishi who had resigned his 
post after the defeat at the 1986 elections was significant. She 
was the first female party leader in Japan's constitutional 
history. Doi Takako， who was elected the leader by an 
overwhelming majority of 83%， declared that she would commit 
herself to three policies: (1) to turn the JSP into a party open 
to every citizen's participat則 1，(2) to make policies of the JSP 
with the citizen's cooperation， (3) to promote women's political 
commitment.“The party cannot gain power as long as it is called 
a negative party. A party called negative cannot change the 
status quo. In a word， a negative party is a conservative 
party." (15) As Doi herself said， the JSP was certainly 
conservati ve in that it had been accepting， although indirectly 
and implicitly， the long-standing one party control of the 
government by the LDP. 
A rise of Doi， who had never b巴longedto the in-party 
factions， created a wave of popularity beyond the JSP's 
expectations. Doi， who was not tainted by scandal and was clear 
thinking， earned citizens' support by showing a straightforward 
political stance against the LDP in regard to the problems of 
corruption and consumer taxes_ Although Doi's emergence was 
truly epoch-making and contained a great potential. she had 
certain limitations because according to the conventional logic of 
the JSP she was an“amateur leader" without the experience of 四
Diet administration and policy activities and had nothing to do 六
(16) with the party's leadership. 
In the July 1989 Upper House election， the JSP gained many 
(14) Kubo Wataru. 1988. “Semarareru to kaikaku no jikko." Gekkωz 
Shakaito， 88/6， p.33 
(15) Doi Tak且ko.1987.“れratashi ga meza日Iseiji kaikaku to josei." Gθkkan 
Shakaito. 87/10， p.103. 
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ex-LDP votes thanks to the Doi boom. The JSP's proportional 
share of the vote was 35.05%， much higher than that of the LDP 
at 27.32%， the Komeito at 10.86%， the JCP (Japan Communist 
Party) at 7.04%， and the DSP. at 4.85%. Doi's JSP， however， 
was faced with limits to its promotion of the government 
alternation project by the opposition parties just after its epoch-
making electoral victory. 
Owing to the rival LDP's problems with the Recruit scandal， 
the possibility for opposition parties to take office increased 
overnight. The JSP executives' enthusiasm seemed boundless. 
“Such a good chance rarely happens. We must rapidly leap over 
the same hurdle that our fellow European parties cleared. If we 
fail， we will regret it forever. (17)" A feeling of bitterness 
remained， however， because Japanese politics took a very 
conservative turn which was contrary to the initial aim of the 
JSP， i.e.， a Social Democratic convergence despite the fact that 
the LDP government collapsed in 1993 and that the JSP 
participated in the anti-LDP coalition government as the primary 
party. 
With the Income-Doubling Program undertaken by the Ikeda 
Cabinet in 1960 as a turning point， economic growth became a 
shared value among the citizens. At that time， the concept of 
Constitution protection and peace that the JSP had been 
advocating was reduced to nothing but rhetoric. In such a 
circumstance， the movement of the JSP and Sohyo (the General 
Council of Trade Unions of Japan) block did not expand beyond 
the framework of labor unions. The JSP which ended up 
四 representingonly the interests of limited categories of workers 
-"牟ノ、 thereafter became the permanent opposition. However， the 1989 
子 electionindicated a possibility that the increase in non-union 
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support could bring a great victory to the JSP. Doi Takako， who 
was particularly interested in developing new political 
supporters， tried to approach various groups including women's 
groups， citizens' groups， consumers' groups and Cooperatives. (18) 
By clearly showing the primary opposition party's political 
direction as different from that of the LDP， Doi responded to 
citizens' expectations. Activists in citizens' and social movements 
who had been estranged from the JSP gradually became attracted 
to her. The JSP was remaking its image and expanding its 
support. It was truly a perfect occasion to form new social bases 
in fields outside the labor movement. (19) Nonetheless， Doi's iル
party base was vulnerable， partly because she had never 
belonged to factions. To make matters worse， Doi's mind was 
occupied by leftist leaders such as Yamamoto Masahiro and 
Iwatare Sukio who had left the so-called “Association"， a hard-
liner faction， to form “Chukan Sα加 (IndependentLeft)" group. 
On the other hand， Doi adopted many activists of the citizens' 
movements， university professors and intellectuals as an 
external think tank， which provoked a reaction from the 
traditional party executives， most of whom came from unions. It 
was not known how they would react if Doi made a mistake. (20) 
The Deadlocked Cooperation among Four Opposition 
Parties 
After the victory in the Upper House election， Doi made it 
clear that her party would form a coalition government. For her， 
it was imperative to promote a preliminary agreement among the 
four opposition parties' coalition government and to strengthen 四
their solidarity in challenging the LDP. The process of S 
(18) Takabatake Michiωshi. 1989・“Shakaitowa ima nani 0 nasu bekika，" d 
Takabatake Michitoshi， hen， Shak品ito:Ma鈍nenyato kara nukedaseru ka， 
Iwanami-shoten. 
(19) Igarashi Jin. 1994.“Hosokawa Renritsu Seiken to Shakaito，" Ohara 
Shakai Mondai K，仰 kyujoZasshi， no. 428. p. 5l. 
(20) Shiihashi. p. 63.63.; Igarashi. p. 51. 
supplanting the LDP was disrupted， however， since the JSP did 
not respond to the other parti出， requests (the Komeito， and the 
DSP in particular). They forced the JSP to change its basic 
policies on issues such as national defense. Meanwhile， there 
was a deep criticism within the JSP which insisted that the Doi 
administration did not have enough vision to take office. (21) 
Some efforts toward policy-pact-building among the 
opposition parties were certainly made. On April 7， 1989， the 
leaders of the four parties met in Kyoto， and they organized the 
coalition government consultation which assumed the brεakdown 
of long-standing government control by the LDP. They started to 
discuss the basic policies of the coalition government and agreed 
to promote electoral cooperation. It was an“epoch-making" event 
in the Postwar history of the opposition parties_ Particularly 
noteworthy was that each party agreed to respect the other 
parties' basic principles with regard to the coalition 
government's basic policies and not to force others to modify 
their stances. They also recognized that coalition government 
would need to build concrete programs for the medium-term or 
long-term perspective. They chose not to form a merger but an 
alliance. In May， they publicly introduced the principle character 
of the national coalition government in a sIogan，“In Search of 
New Politics: joint policies of the national coalition 
ム， (22) government 
After the Four Party Leaders' Meeting on April 7， and 
consequent coalition government consultation， the first step 
toward office was supposed to be completed by June and the 
~ second step should have been made around the time of the 
九 UpperHouse election. Yet， a problem soon arose. There emerged 
o a deep anxiety: could the four parties， the JSP， the Komeito， the 
DSP and the Shaminren (Social Democratic Federation)， hold 
(21) Shiihashi. p. 63・64.
(22) Ito Shigeru. 1989“Kokumin Ren芯oe no Michi: Shakaito wa nami 0 
subeki ka，" Gekkan Shakaito. 89/8. p. 32-39. 
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together? Twenty years ago there had been a split between the 
JSP and the DSP， and it seemed reasonable to think that 
maintaining solidarity would be very troublesome. As a matter 
of fact， there was deadlock among the parties regarding policy-
shifting about the Japan-US Security Treaty， the Self岨Defense
Forces， and nuclear power plants. It seemed difficult to reach a 
compromise. Moreover， there was a criticism that the four party 
coalition project might end up with simply a party alliance 
which would be different from a genuine citizens' alliance based 
(23) on broader national support. ¥"'0) This was a serious problem 
because the project itself did not obtain national trust. Actually， 
the citizens had a strong feeling of distrust especially after 
seeing the many alliances and rivalries among the parties: the 
JSP， the Komeito， the DSP and the Shaminren cooperated with 
each other over the issue of sales tax， but the LDP， the Komeito 
and the DSP did so in regard to the consumption tax， and then 
the JSP， the Komeito and the DSP cooperated after the Recruit 
Scandal was disclosed. (24) 
The JSP tried to shift its poIicies on the Japan-US. Security 
Treaty， the Self-Defense Forces and nuclear power plants by 
creating the “Doi Vision" in September 1989. Between the 
preparation of the draft proposal and its presentation， however， 
there was entirely different attitudes on pragmatism and a 
strong reaction against realism. The “Doi Vision"， after al， was 
created only to recognize the importance of anti-realist criticism. 
The scenario was exactly opposite to that of the promoters of 
coalition government of the JSP， the Komeito， the DSP and the 
Shaminren. Doi herself said，“Some people say that now the JSP 
should be more realistic. Such a claim is a criticism of the 
(23) Ito Shigeru. 1989.呪okuminRengo Seiken e no mosaku: Shakaito ni 
towareru shutaisei to rengo no tetsugaku，" Shunohara Hajime， Ouchi 
Hideaki， Ito Shigeru taidan， Gekkan Shakaito， 89/8， p. 14-17. 
(24) Ouchi Hideaki. 1989.“Kokumin Rengo Seiken e no mosaku: Shakaito 
ni towareru shutaisei to rengo no tetsugaku，" Shunohara Hajime， 
Ouchi Hideaki， Ito Shigeru taidan， Gekkan Shakaito， 89/8， p. 21. 
socialist policies about the Self-Defense Forces， the Japan-US 
Security Treaty and nuclear power plants. I want to listen to 
these opinions. However， what would happen if you just yielded 
to the established facts that Japan alr巴adyhas the third largest 
Armed Force in the world under the Peace Constitution， and that 
the Self-Defense Force is comprised of a skyrocketing GNP and 
the world's most advanced microelectronic technology? The 
Japan-US Security Treaty was made under the pretext of “threat 
of the Soviet and China" when the Cold War was at its heights， 
particularly when the Korean war heated up. What would 
happen domestically and internationally if you strengthened the 
Treaty despite the collapse of the Cold War structure? Don't you 
worry that increasing nuclear power plants could fatally 
endanger nations' lives and health when people al over the 
world are concerned about the problem of how to discard 
radioactive waste and accidents at the nuclear power plants of 
Chernobyl and Three Mile Islands? There are many opinions 
among the citizens about such important problems. We expect 
that a nationwide discussion would be fully developed." (25) 
Owing to Doi's stance， the four party coalition government 
collapsed， and the JSP became the focus of criticism from both 
capitalists' and politicians. 
It was significant that the JSP and other opposition parties' 
offensive in presenting the consumption tax abrogation bil 
occurred immediately after the Upper House election. As a 
matter of fact， a series of events， four party consultation toward 
a coalition government， the Upper House election， and jointly 
.~ proposing the consumer tax 
七 important. Yet the Liberal Democratic Kaifu Cabinet， too， 
assiduously tried to regain voters' trust and so recovered the 
support for the LDP. 1n such an unsettled climate， the Lower 
House election was to take place in 1990. The opposition parties 
(25) Doi Takako. 1989. "Atarashii seiji e no chosen，" Gekkan Shakaito， 
89/11， p. 23-24. 
needed to present a united front on the Doi Cabinet and four 
parties' consensus concerning the basic policies. Nonetheless， the 
JSP did not honestly respond to questions about the basic 
structure and policies of the future coalition government raised 
by the DSP and the Komeito in July and August after the 
electoral victory. (26) It was very plausible， therefore， that the 
LDP， which rεcognized such a dissonance among the opposition 
parties， would try to realign the political spectrum by coopting 
the DSP and the Komeito before the Lower House election. 
Social Democracy is originally an economic project whose 
goals are to redistribute the national economy. Problems of 
national defense and nuclear power plants are a secondary 
matter. The JSP and the DSP have confronted each other for 
many years over the problem of the Self-Defense Forcεs， a 
secondary issue from the social democratic perspective. The 
problems of the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Self-Defense 
Forces could not helf the JSP realize a coalition government. In 
the 1989 election， the JSP attracted the female votes and the 
undecided voters， by which it could purge itself of its old image 
of a workers' party. Yet these votes were simply anti・LDPvotes， 
and the voters did not find a new and satisfying alternative in 
the JSP to replace the LDP. Although important， the problems of 
the Security Treaty， the SelfωDefense Forces and nuclear power 
plants were foreign to the voters' actual interests. The JSP was 
so inexperienced that it followed too closely the rules of the 
game set by the DSP and Komeito. Since a coalition gov巴rnment
can achieve only the centrist policies agreed upon by al 
members， the JSP could not help but to follow the centrist li肘 2
and let these difficult problems slide. As a matter of fact， an 六
alliance with the LDP was more advantageous for the centrist 三
parties than with the JSP. (27) 
(26) Kubo Wataru. 1990. “San.in no tatakai to Shu-in tasu-h旦 nokeisei 
e，" Gekkan Shakaito， 90/2 
(27) Tak註batake.1989. p. 133.144. 
The Victory at the 1989 Election and the JSP's Confusion 
“The mountain has moved." Doi quoted a famous Japanese 
female poet at the ballot counting. Actually， the 1989 Upper 
House election brought great triumph to the JSP. There were 
various explanations for such a victory. One adviser to the JSP 
was too optimistic when he commented:“The electoral results 
will not be ephemeral this tim巴. Judging from the last two 
elections (Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election and the Upper 
House election)， the same trend wilI continue. In the coming 
Lower House election， such a basic structural trend wiU not 
change.…It is verified by the structure of society. We need to 
recognize such a trend since the voters' structure is relatively 
constant. This is a systemic shift.… Honestly speaking， the last 
，(28) election is a typical case of a revolution in advanced society.' 
Objectively speaking， however， the socialist victory was not due 
to structural changes in society. It simply resulted from the fact 
that ]apanese voters who had become more selfish during the 
1980s reacted sensitively to the issue of consumption tax that 
(29) would directly affect their own wallets. ''''~J The concentration of 
socialist votes stemmed not from the appcal of the JSP's policies 
based on a long-term vision for the future， but from Doi's 
personal popularity， the governing party's failure in coping with 
consumption tax problems， and thεdisclosure of scandals and 
political corruption. The ]SP actually won by absorbing the 
LDP's votes and the undecided， but its votes by the original 
party supporters were only one third of its total votes. There 
was a drastic increase of votes by the self-employed， merchants， 
housewives and farmer日 who were not socialist supporters 
oriεinally. (30) The flow of votes seemed to change quickly. Since 
??????
(28) Shinohara Hajime. 1989.“San-in sen 1"0 no josei to Shakaito e 110 
kitai: Shinohara Hajime， Miyakawa Takayosi， Chiba Keiko Taidal1，" 
Gekkan Shakaito， 89/9， pp. 22.45. 
(29) Kohayashi Yoshiaki. 1989 ・'Shakaitono shori wa kozoteki ka: 
Seronchδsa de miru shakai ishiki no henka to hoko，" Gekkan Shakaito. 
89112， pp. 6十78
the JSP had litle experience of overwhelming electoral victory 
and was mesmerized as its long-standing decline came to an end. 
Such an illusion was fatal for the party's rebirth. 
It was true出atthe citizens' dissatisfaction over the Recruit 
scandal and enforcement of consumption tax provoked the LDP's 
crushing defeat at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly clection 
and Upper House election. If this were Western Europe， a 
government alternation would be realized. It was not th巴casein 
Japan， however， which demonstrated the peculiarity of Japanese 
opposition parties. The JSP totally lacked the ability to pull 
down the old conservative government. The JSP publicly 
declared in its “New Declaration" of 1986 its intention to 
become a governing party. As a next step， however， itfailed 
fully to cultivate its policy formation ability. (31) A governing 
party is required to deliberate with its coalition partners in 
regard to thcir policies， and at the same time it must 
demonstrate strong leadership. The JSP did have certain degree 
of such a recognition. Actually， the JSP invited executives of 
well-governed social democratic parties from West European 
countries to Japan in November 1989 to ask for their advice on 
strategies before and after taking office. (32) 
Nonetheless， for the top managers of ]apanese big 
enterprises， the JSP stil seemed to remain in its old shell. The 
business managers thought that Japan was faced with tough 
barriers in almost every field including education， public 
administration and tax systems and that Japan needed radical 
and immediate reforms. Japanese capitalists and managers 
wanted a Il川a削
四
(は30ω)Takaba乱takeMi代chitωoshi礼.1989弘.“Kokumin日1iおshi討kino henka tωo Shaka幻itωο 
五no shtihen，" Gセkkat!Shakaito， 89/11， p.43. 
(31) Nitta Shunzο. 1989.“Rinen kara seisaku e: Seio Shaminto seiken ni 
manabu koto， "Gekkan Shakaiめ， 89/10，pp. 56-61. 
(32)“Seikento tosite no seisaku ritsuan e: Shakaiminshushugi seisaku 
foramu ni tsuite， Kawa日呂kiKanji Shakaishu宮iRiron Senta shocho ni 
kiku，" Gekkan Shakaito， 90/1， p. 84-9l. 
the nation. There was a recognition among managers that the 
LDP no longer served them well. For them， however， the JSP stiU 
seemed to be a party“that stuck to the old ideology of taking the 
problem of disparity in wealth too seriously in spite of a new 
social situation in which 85% of the population was the middle 
1_~_ ，(33) class. 
Meanwhile， the LDP recovered its support to more than 
40% within two months after the election according to various 
public-opinion polls. Contrary to the pre-electoral situation， the 
LDP had a lead over the JSP by 5 to 10 points. The JSP was on 
the offense before the election， but turned to the defensive after 
the electoral victory. While the LDP made a drama over 
replacing Prime Minister Uno with Kaifu， the JSP did not resort 
to any action. Moreover， a too clear triumph of the JSP triggered 
other opposition parties' reaction and made the coalition 
government project hard to work with. They failed to propose an 
overall vision for the future coalition government. The socialist 
victory in the Upper House election simply resulted from a 
reactionary concentration of the ex・LDPvotes to the JSP. Voters 
did not necessarily positively evaluate the policies advocated by 
the JSP. Therefore， the ex-LDP reactionary votes turned into 
strong dissatisfaction with the JSP immediately after its electoral 
(34) victory. 
In retrospect， the Declaration of 1986 did not make it clear 
if the JSP aimed at a traditional Fordist social democracy or a 
more liberal post-Fordism. Objectively observing the current 
rise and fal of socialist leader Doi， itbecomes clear that the JSP 
~ wanted to realize山 traditionalSocial Democracy that could 
never be achieved in Japan where labor unions had already been 
ム conservatized.What was truly required was for the JSP to 
ノ、
fortify its ties with new groups while maintaining the unionists' 
(33) Kaku Ryilzaburo. 1989.“Korekara no Nihon no susumubeki michi，" 
Gekkan Shakaito， 89/11， p.69. 
(34) Uchida Kenzo. 1989.“Seikyoku no gen-dankai to Shakaito no kadai，" 
Gekkan Shak叫to，89/11， pp. 70-80. 
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support. In such a context， Doi's position was extremely 
significant. The ex-unionists and old executives did not back her 
sufficiently， however. A new citizen-oriented trend within the 
JSP had keen senses， but at the same time it had a strong 
antagonism against labor unionism. The relationship between the 
old executives and Doi Takako can be expressed as 
confrontation between Fordism vs. liberal post-Fordism， 
laborists vs. radical liberals. 
The former won the in-party conflict. Nonetheless， it 
committed double faults: first， the social democracy based simply 
on labor unions had already become out of date as West 
European countries indicated (35); and secondly， unions' function 
as the politicaI base had already been weakened because of the 
conservatization of J apanese unions themselves and their joining 
the conservative post-Fordist trend by approaching the LDP. 
As a matter of fact， the unionists' influence on the JSP used 
to be immense. Until the 1980s， 60 to 70% of Socialist MPs came 
from the Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan). For 
instance， among the 18 candidates listed in the proportional list 
at the 1983 election， 44% were occupied by Sohyo candidates， and 
al the candidates except one from the fourth to the twelfth rank 
were from the Sohyo. With respect to the proportional district at 
the 1986 election， the upper nine candidates out of eighteen were 
directly backed by the おhyo.When so many unionists occupy 
the parliamentary seats， the party may well become a unions' 
party and lose the function of a national party. The Socialist 
dependence on unions was long recognized as one of the two 
factors that had brought on the longitudinal decline of the JSP 
along with the internal conflicts between the Socialist left and 
right. It was not until its crushing defeat in the 1986 elections 
that the JSP started trying to be more independent from the 
unions. Yet， the truth was that the JSP had no other choice once 
a 
(35) Magara Hideko. 1994.“Yoroppa rodo seiji no shintenkai，" Ohara 
Shakai M仰 daiKenkyujo Zasshi. 
the unions decided to support the LDP in order to realize their 
own interests. Doi thoroughly avoided dependence on the unions 
and sought the party's base among citizens and women. She 
intended to erect three pillars of support with these two groups 
plus the unions. Yet， there was a strong contention within the 
]SP which insisted that no radical party not based on unions 
could exist. According to such an opinion， citizens and womεn 
were too whimsical to rely on， and only the unions were 
reliable. (36) Such a stance has been continuing until the1990s 
Each tansan (industrial union) can freely spend money 
unconnected to particular accounts during electoral periods. 
Even relatively small t，αηsans are said to spend some 50 million 
yen per candidate. Unlike Liberal Democratic MPs， Socialist MPs 
have nothing but their yearly pay. Unionists' support has been 
(37) essential for them. 
Transformation of Unions and Yamagishi's Political Strategy 
Meanwhile， unions experienced a big transformation. Labor 
movements continued to decline on global scale in the 1980s. 
]apanese unions were not an exception. A drastic decrease in 
Socialist support， too， showed such a tendency. Quality of labor 
changed. A large part of the labor market became occupied by 
temporary and short-term employees such as part-time and 
extεrnal workers. Along with the growth of the tertiary 
industries， the employment in this sector became unstable and 
the workers' fluidity was considerably high. Workers tended to 
be fragmented. Most of them were not accustomed to organizing 
~ workers' interests and solida r.~!Y. In Sl凶 a situation， t廿胤ra附従E凶
(38) unions could hardly survive. 
I¥. 
1n this period， the limit of the traditional role of unions was 
(36) Shiihashi， p. 84.87. 
(:i7) y且mamuraAkiyoshi. 1994.“Matasaki Rengo 800 man-nin wa doko巴
yuku，" Purefidento， 94/11， p.42. 
(38) Ouchi TsutOlllU. 1987 “Rodosha towa nanika: Shakaito saisei tono 
kanren de，" Gekkan Shakaito， 89/2， p. 147-157. 
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revealed. Unions began to reorganize themselves and tried to 
change their basic policies. In November 1987， the Zenminrokyo， a 
federation of private sector unions， decided to become "Rengo"， 
and in July 1987 the Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of 
Japan) decided to accept a total merger of the public and private 
unions by 1990 on the basis of the installation of the Rengo， and 
then to clissol ve i ts巴lf.Nonetheless， the process of reorganizing 
the labor movements， which was triggered by efforts to 
overcome the oil crisis， remained plagued by the absence of any 
justification beyond that of mere“economic adjustment". 
Retrospectively， the Spring Offensive at the beginning of the 
1970s contained some citizen-oriented aspects in that it 
advocated the demands shared by whole nation such as 
consumer prices， a tax system， meclical care， pension， housing 
and public pollution. These demands could not be achieved 
without changing the existing politico-economic framework. In 
this sense it involved a certain philosophy beyoncl the mere 
“economic adjustment" argument. Yet， such a movement collapsed 
without yielding any results. The movement lost influence owing 
to the clefeat on the part of the public sector unions at the strike 
for the right to strike in 1975. It became clear that the project to 
realize citizens' demands at the Spring Offensive was in fact a 
specious pretense for the unions to attain a wage raise. The 
unions failecl to builcl solidarity with citizens. Actually， the 
unions lackecl a philosophical basis within the labor movement， 
although they were expected to discuss with the citizens how the 
national economy and the local industries should evolve beyond 
being a merE negotlator on wages and working conditions.(39) 
At the installation of the Rengo in November 1989， 
Yamagishi set his sights on beating the LDP government and 
realizing a government alternation through a policy-pact among 
the JSP， the Komeito， the DSP and the Rengo. He requested that 
(39) Hyodo Tsutomu. 1987. "Tenkan ki ni okeru rodakumiai kino，" Gekkan 
Shakaito， 87/9， p. 14.24. 
Doi Takako's JSP be more realistic about the issues of the Japan-
US. Security Treaty， Self Defense Forces and nuclear power 
plants. At the same time， he thought that the new Rengo. which 
included the public sector unions， must demonstrate leadership 
in reorganizing opposition parties without being fragmented 
between the Domei (Japanese Confederation of Labor) -DSP block 
and the Sohyo-JSP block. He also advocated the West German 
type of proportional representation system in order to challEゴ1ge
the majoritarianism supported by the conservatives within the 
Re11go who shared values with business leaders.“We have to try 
to organize a broad political alliance among opposition parties 
except the JCP so that we can rep1ace the LDP government and 
establish a two-party system in which government alternations 
can be smoothly achieved. A coalition government by the JSP， 
the Komeito， the DSP， the Shaminren and other sympathizers - 1 
think that is exactly the true political reform expected by 
， (40) workers and citizens.' 
When asked for his opinion on the LDP's political reform 
by Gotoda Masaharu， Chair of the LDP reform committee， 
Yamagishi offered several proposals coneerning politieal ethies， 
realization of non-money-consuming politics， eleetoral reform and 
self-renovation of parties. For Yamagishi， not only morality but 
a1so the establishment of a political system that woulcI realize 
government alternation are imperative to eliminate seandals and 
political corruption. As was argued in Italy， he thought that the 
absence of government alternation promoted corruption. 
国TheSoc刷 stDecline and Doi's Re刈 nation
九 The1990 General Election was a critical crossroads for 
(三 Japanesepolities. ln the 1989 election， the conditions necessary 
心 forthe LDP's one party control of government disappeared， and 
a possibility for opposition parties to replace the LDP was 
(40) Yamagishi Akira_ 1990.“Seiji kaikaku to senkyo seido no monclai: 
Uchida Kenzo， Yama耳ishiAkira， Tan昌beMakoto taidan，" Gekkan 
Shakaito， 9717， p.17. 
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gradually increasing. The 1990 election， however， resulted in the 
failure of the opposition parties because they could not realize 
government alternation. The LDP doubled its number of votes 
compared with the 1.5 million vot巴sit had received in the 
Upper House election of 1989， although at that time it lost seats. 
The JSP increased its votes by 60%. However， the JSP suffered a 
political defeat.“The socialist leaders have been thinking that 
they won an election only if their number of seats increased a 
litle. This was a problem with the JSP for the past 30 years. . 
(41) ， Winning an election means taking office. ¥，i.lJ" The JSP not only 
failed to make electoral cooperation with the potential partners 
of the coalition government， but also to show a clear vision of 
the government in replacing the LDP with the Japanese 
electorates. The meaning of this defeat was significant. This 
election can be understood as the election that substantially 
closed the possibility for the forces， which otherwise might have 
become Social Democratic， the JSP， the DSP， the Shaminren， to 
establish a coalition government. It opened the way for a two 
conservative party system in Japan which appears peculiar 
among the party systems of advanced societies. An opportunity 
for the Social Democrats' control of government never came 
thereafter. 
The increase in JSP's vote， despite its strategic failure to 
take office through a coalition government， seemed to make the 
situation even worse. As the ltalian case of the PCI / PDS 
(42) indicated， ¥%J the most direct incentive for a party to promote its 
own reform normally can be found in its electoral defeats. The 
growth in the number of JSP's votes might prevent the party 
from recognizing the growing necessity to change itself. 
(41) Uchida M出 uru.1990. "Se町 yakutekis批 nkara mita sose出 yo:Ito 
Masaya， Uchida Mitsuru， Kubo Wataru taidan，" Gekkan Shakaito. 
90/4， pp. 25.26 
(42) Hicleko Ma耳ara.1996“Political Reform and Realignment in Italy (II): 
The Dynamics of Italian Elector旦IReform and Its Transitional 
Outcome，" Tsukuba Review 0/ L乱wand Politicι1 Sci側 ce.no‘21. 
The cleavage between the JSP and the Komeito.DSP 
deepened owing to the Socialists' overwhelming victory in the 
February 1990 General Election and became critical at the 
outbreak of the Gulf War in August 1990. The JSP was sharply 
confronted with the LDP， the Komeito and the DSP over the 
problem of dispatching the Self Defense Forces abroad. In the 
situation from 1989 to 1990， Yamagishi's project on the coalition 
government among the JSP， the Komeito， the DSP suffered a 
setback. After the Socialist defeat in the 1991 Local Elections， 
Doi resigned as the Chair of the JSP. The relationship between 
the JSP and Komeito， DSP became even colder. It was the LDP 
that effectively coopted the Komeito and the DSP. 
The JSP issued “A Report on the JSP Reform: Political 
Reform and the JSP's Responsibility" on June 20， 1991. The 
Committee on the JSP Reform was set up in response to the 
historical defeat at in April Local Elections. That is to say， the 
defeat in the April Local Elections was a critical retreat. The 
election of the Governor of Tokyo， in particular， resulted in a 
humiliating defeat on the part of the JSP. Its share of votes was 
even smaller than that of the Communists and its deposit money 
was confiscated. The JSP， which lacked the sense of electoral 
competition and determination， not only failed to nominate Doi as 
a candidate for Governor but also fixed its image of vacillation. 
Doi Takako and other executives resigned from their posts on 
June 24. 
Tanabe Makoto， who was elected new leader of the JSP 
succeeding Doi Takako， lacked charisma， but he tried to break 
the Socialists' stalemate from the right side of the party. The JSP 
did not actively seek a government alternation by establishing a 
coalition among the Socialists， Komeito and DSP in the 1990 
election. In order to retake the office， a different structure was 
needed. The JSP's coalition project in the 1990 election was 
numerically vulnerable. Since it excluded the JCP， the coalition 
could not reach a majority， and it was plausible that the 
Communists would hold the deciding vote in the Parliament. (43) 
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Therefore， itwas rational that Tanabe strongly intended to 
break through the Socialist stagnation by using the word 
“liberal" in addition to“social democratic convergence" in the 
1990 electoral campaign. By using the word “liberal"， he wanted 
to create a shared basis with a certain part of the LDP， more 
concretely， with Miki Takeo and Miyazawa Kiichi's groups. 
Tanabe said:“Progress and reform， peace and disarmament -
with these shared values， itis not at al impossible that we 
cooperate with each other. (11)" It should be noted， however， that 
Tanabe's“liberal" meant nothing more than a soft-linεr within 
the conservati ves which was completely different from more 
flexible and more citizen-oriented radical liberalism advocated 
by Doi Takako. 
As a matter of fact， an alliance excluding th巴JCPcould not 
attain a majority in the Lower House. Another alternative was 
needed. For Tanabe， therefore， a strategy to add the 
conservative liberals， who seemed to agree to some policies 
proposed by the JSP to the coalition partners， was a logical step 
Yamagishi， the Rengo leader， also， supportecl such a strategy. 
Nonetheless， as Yamagishi himself emphasized， such a coalition 
government must be transitional:“The liberals should not be the 
(45) " main actors. The opposition parties should be the nucleus. 
Aclclitionally， for Yamagishi， who himself was a Socialist and 
strongly advocated a coalition government by the JSP， Komeito 
and DSP， access to the soft-liners of the LDP seemed necessary， 
once his initial social democratic project collapsed. Yamagishi's 
second scenario， however， requirccl the sclf-renovation of tl及、
Socialist party. 
????
(43) lto Masaya.“Senryakuteki shiten kara mita sosenkyo，" p. 27.28. 
(4) Tanabe Makoto. 1992.“Shamin sokesshu e kondo koso sutemi 出:
san-insen go wa seiken e no tenki ga kuru-Dai2ki Tanabe Iincho no 
honne 0 kiku， "Gekkan Shakaito， 9211， p.14. 
(45) Yama耳hishiAkira. 1992.“Hi-jimin seiken seiryoku no saidaigen 
i王日ssh白 e: Yamaghishi Akira， Taka只hiIkuro taidan，" Gekkan Shakaito， 
9212， p.24. 
“The JSP should revise the New Declaration of 1986. That 
was a piece of formulaic literature based on the East-West 
confrontation and the Yalta Agreement.… The world has 
changed. The JSP should establish a program in the context of 
(46) " today's new world. ¥'WJ" Yamagishi imposed this special request 
on the JSP. In any case， the socialist word goken (protection of 
the Constitution) ， while appeared in many speaches and 
(47) writings， was associated with the old image of socialists. ，."J The 
Doi boom， the subsequent boom of the New Wave， and the Rengo 
Yamagishi boomー thesebooms contained potential demands of 
citizens for an entirely new politics. There was no political force 
capable of structuring these demands on the long-term basis， 
however， some forces responded to them only on a short-term 
basis. After al， what had been the modus operandi for the JSP 
was the conventional confrontation which had been built through 
a postwar Japanese politics without government alternation. The 
JSP was deeply invested this structure although it criticized the 
intimacy between capitalists， bureaucrats and politicians and the 
corruption that stemmed from a long-standing one party control 
(48) of government. 
In May 1992， Hosokawa Morihiro organized the Nihon 
Shinto (Japan New Party)， and Japanese politics was thrown into 
an uproar. In the Upper House election that took place on July 
26， 1992， the JSP lost and the LDP won overwhelmingly. The 
latter recovered enough seats to secure the majority of the 
reelected MPs. Conversely， the JSP was stagnant and the Rengo 
suffered a terrible defeat. The LDP obtained 127 seats. The 
Komeito increased the number of its seats to 14 -the equalling 
its previous record high. The DSP and the JCP did not factor 
??????
(46) Ibid. p. 24. 
(47) Iwami Takao. 1992.“Shamin sokesshu e kondo koso sutemi de: San 
ins巴ngo wa seiken e no tenki ga kuru: Dai2ki Tanabe Iincho no 
honne 0 kiku，" Gekkan Shakaito， 92/1， p.9. 
(48) Uchida Kenzo. 1992.“Hosokawa Sinto wa naze detekita ka，" Gekkan 
Shakaito， 92/7， p. 27. 
into the race. The Nihon Shinto got 4 candidates elected in its 
first election. (49) The cruel results of the 1992 election forced 
the realist union leaders to change their strategies concerning 
their party backing. In this sense， the 1992 election 
turning pOlllt. 
a was 
??????
Capitalists， Ozawa Ichiro， and the Internal Conflicts 01 the 
Rengδ 
By November 1991， two ful years had already passed since 
the formation of the Rengo. Meanwhile， the Rengo was not able to 
present a united front over such crucial national issues as UN-
PKO bil and policies on the Gulf War bccause of internal 
conflicts between the Socialist block and the Democratic Socialist 
block. Having misgivings about this situation， Chairman 
Yamagishi and others held an executi ve meeting at Atami in May 
1991 and issued a report titled “How to organize a new political 
force capable of takinεoffice." The RengO's stance on political 
realignment seemcd to be “anti-LDP， Social Democratic 
integration". Yet there were various views concerning the extent 
to which the Reηgo should keep its distance from the LDP. 
In retrospect， the first attempt to integrate union movement 
during the 1970s failed， but thc second attempt in the 1980s was 
successful. because the “economic conformist line" of the private 
unions dominated the ]apanese labor movement after the first oil 
shock of 1973 in the midst of the deepening employment 
problems. The unions of big companies and of private local 
industries became more vociferous， and they also sought to 
participate in the process of state policy-making. They sought to 
talk not only to the opposition parties but to the LDP， 
bureaucrats， and various business associations. They， in 
particular， tried to get in touch with the highly rankcd 
bureaucrats at the Ministri巴sand public agencies. The then-
President of Tek加計en(Japan Federation of Iron and Steel 
(49) Asahi Shinbun， luly 27， 1992. 
Workers' Unions) Washio Etsuya said :“The unions were able 
to collect the necessary information only after we developed a 
method to directly approach to highly ranked bureaucrats.…I 
understood that information is kept only within the privileged 
c1asses." 1n such a situation， the opinion that the unions should 
be more intimate with the LDP in order to realize their policies， 
and that they should strengthen their “functional relationship" 
with the LDP and various ministries became stronger. The big 
company unions in particular became LDP-oriented. 1n addition 
to the trends of Washio and others， there were two other groups 
within the Rengo: one was the group led by Chairman Yamagishi 
who asserted thεneed for Social Democratic integration， the other 
was the DSP related group which was worry of Social Democratic 
(50) unification. These three trends conflicted with each oth巴r
Due to a situation， they tried to attain an internal consensus 
at Reηgo's executive meeting in May 1992. Chairman Yamagishi 
had already declared the following four points to be included in 
Rengo's political strategies: (1) a new coalition governm巴nt
should be a non-LDP government， (2) it should pursue not the 
American type conservative two-party system but， the European 
type two-party system (the conservatives vs. the socia! 
democrats)， (3) a coalition between the LDP and the JSP should 
not be discussed for the moment， (4) the opposition parties' 
cooperation would be possible only if there was a consensus on 
their basic policies of diplomacy and defense. According to 
Yamagishi， the Rengo had 8 million members， and 60% of whom 
supported the JSP， 30% the DSP， and 10% of them were neutral. 
EIll spite of Ya叫
(EadlditC白r‘i1at廿ion through i同nt伐eg♂rat“ingthe Socia討IDem口lOcrat討icforces， 
:コ土工-;: t出hos別古火犯ewho want旬edtωo app戸I
ノ、
to join in state policy-making tried to dominate the Rengゑ Thus，
the situation was quite f1uid. (51) 
(;)0) Egami Sumio. 1992.“Rengo seiji hoshin 0 do yomu ka: Lsuyomaru 
出世itotono kinoteki kankt>i-rol1 110 keiko，" Gek!?日nS'halzaito， 92/2， p. 
29-34. 
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Above al， the leaders of the major unions in the private 
sector proclaimed that the Rengo had to recognize the new 
political conditions in reconsidering its political strategy. 
Tekkororen's chairman Washio asserted that it was impossible to 
establish a political group capable of taking office merely by 
integrating the existing political parties， and so it was essential 
to organize an utterly new party. The Zendentsu (Japan 
Telecommunications Workers' Union)， one of the most powerful 
pro-Socialist unions， also， claimed that the Rengo should revise 
its policies from the formation of a Social Democratic pole to the 
maximum integration of the reformists. The leading unions in 
private sector such as ]idoshaso ren (Confederation of Japan 
Automobile Workers' Union) and the Denkirengo (Japanese 
Electrical Electronic and Information Union) particularly 
asserted that they wished to expand their political influence by 
selectively supporting only those MPs and candidates who fully 
understood and cooperated with the Rengo and that they did not 
stick to the social democratic project at all. Contrary to these 
unions in private sector， Chairman Goto of the ]ichiro (All 
Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union)， the biggest 
sanbetsu union in the Rengo， said:“It may be necessary to 
dissolve the parties to organize a new one in future. But why 
now?" Chairman Itδof the Zentei (Japan Postal Workers' 
Union)， a leading union in public sector， emphasized that only 
the Social Democratic forces could represent workers' true 
(52) interests. 
In April 1992， the Seiji Kaikα仇4， So初shin Kyogikai 
(Committee for Political Reform) was set up. This was the so・
called M仰向n Seiji Rinc加 with Kamei Masao (Honorary 
ad visor to the N幼'keI1明tor the Japan Federation of Employers' 
(51) Nakajima Hisao. 1992. “ Kihon s鈴悶eiおsakt如Eαωude fu叩m町l
yaku k王a訂igi仁RyOdokasuru sei江toto r凸d白kumiaitono kankei仁"Gekkan 
Shakaito， 9217， pp. 55-62. 
(52) Nakajima Hisao. 1992.喰engo， Sanbetsu taikai ni miru seiji hoshin，" 
Gekkan Shakaito， 92/12， pp. 74-75. 
Associations) as the chairman. The committee was composed of 
business leaders and union leaders such as Hiraiwa Gaishi 
(chair of the Keiぬnren or Federation of Economic 
Organigations) and Yamag凶1iAkira (chair of the Re昭0).About 
100 extra-party MPs， too， joined this organization目 Kameiet al. 
asserted:“Not only is Japan's politics unable to respond to the 
changing world but it is also losing its function. We cannot sit 
and wait for actions by political parties who are frozen in a 
traditional framework." He strongly advocated the promotion of 
political reform. He emphasized these views at the general 
meeting that took place after the non-confidence vote for the 
Miyazawa Cabinet was passed， and when the so-called 1955 
regime completely collapsed a political realignment was needed. 
He stressed the necessity of establishing a new political regime. 
Rengo's Yamagishi， too， advocated that both managers and 
(53) workers together should back the political reform project. 
What should be noted was that the Rengo could not produce 
a shared opinion among its member unions. There was a 
considerable difference between Yamagishi's Social Democratic 
line and that of the private sector union leaders. The stance of 
the latter， that is to say， the conservative realists within the 
Rengo， was extremely close to Ozawa Ichira's stance. In 
September 1992， Ozawa Ichira held a secret meeting with the 
executives of the leading Rengo member unions inc1uding 
Tokumoto Teruhito (chair of the Jidoshαsoren) ， Ashida Jinnosuke 
(chair of the Zensendomei 01' Japanese Federation of Textile， 
Garment， Chemical， M巴rcantileand Allied Industry Workers' 
百 Union)，Sonoki Kyuji (chair of the Zende1山 u)，and Washio 
~ Etsuya (chair of the Tek知的ren).These union leaders completely 
二 agreed with Ozawa's opinion that stressed the necessity of 
)¥ 
organizing new political forces beyond the traditional framework 
of existing parties - the JSP and the DSP. Faced with the 
(53) Yomiuri shinbun Seiji-bu， ed叶 1993.Seikai Saihen 附 Makt似た， Tokyo 
Yomiuri Shinbun-sha， p. 58-59 
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devastating defeat on the part of the JSP， the DSP and the Rengo 
in the 1992 Upper House election， these union leaders realized 
that the Social Democratic project was no longer feasible and 
strongly urged the rise of a new party that would replace old 
guards. Furthermore， the main unions， such as the Zendentsu， 
practiced what was called seゆetsu-suisen (selecti ve 
recommendation of candidates) by which they did not 
recommend the leftwing Socialist candidates so that they would 
not be elected in the Lower House election. Yamagishi's line was 
different from Ozawa's. It was true that Yamagishi shared 
certain views with Ozawa in that both of them sought to 
establish a non-LDP government. Yamagisl】i's scenario of 
political realignment， however， prεsupposed that a Social 
Democratic new party would play a central role in political 
restructuring. As a matter of fact， there was an intense conflict 
between Yamagishi and Ozawa over the pattern of political 
(54) reshuffling. 
M巴anwhilethe impact of the dissolution of the Sohyo Center 
that was planned for March 1993 seemed extremely severe for 
the JSP. The dissolution of the Sohyo， which was integrally 
connected to the JSP， meant that “a substantial part of the JSP 
would be lost" and seemed to fatally weaken the JSP's 
relationship with their friend unions who actually served as its 
(55) electoral campaign staff. ¥JJ) The JSP responded to this event on 
October 29， 1992 by organizing the Conference of Pro田Socialist
Unions (so-called Rentai su仰 K仰) designed to fortify the 
linkage between the JSP and unions 巴venafter the planned 
dissolution of the Sohyo Center. Thirtyone unions with four 
million members joined the Rentai suru Kai. Akamatsu Hirotaka， 
Director of the Labor Bureau of the JSP， argued that establishing 
networks with various social sectors and strata including 
(54) Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu， ed.， 1993. Seikai Saihen no Makuake， Tokyo: 
Yomiuri Shinbun-sha， p. 61-62. 
(55) Utsuki Norio. 1992 “Sohyo Center kaisan ga semaru Shakaito no 
kaikaku，" Gekkan Shakaito， 92/7， p. 64.72. 
citizens' activists， scholars， thεintellectuals， the self-employed 
was imperative for the JSP to take office and that strengthening 
the ties to the unions was a part of such network-building. He 
defined the Rel1tai suru Kai not as a transitional but as a 
permanent organization that would help realize future JSP-led 
(56) governments. ¥，JUj As a matter of fact， the JSP needed generally to 
reinforce its appeal to citizens in order to expand their support 
on the one hand， while maintaining its influence on unions on the 
other hand. Even though the JSP aimed at coopting a broader 
range of citizens， itdid not yet have established networks. Thus， 
the existence of unions continued to be important. 
The Waves of LDP-Scandals and the Socialists' Response 
The disclosure of Sagawa-Kyubin's secret donation of 500 
million yen to LDP's Kanemaru Shin soon resulted in a split of 
the Tαkeshitα-hα， thεLDP's most powerful in-party faction， th巴n
in the split of the LDP itself and consequently produced the 
Hosokawa coalition government， while pushing the citizens' 
distrust of politics to the limits. 
In August 1992， itwas revealed that Kanemaru received 
500 million Yen from Sagawa's president Watanabe， which 
forced Kanemaru to resign his post of LDP vice-president. Not 
only was the Sagawa case， but it was also disclosed that mobs 
were active behind the rise of LDP vice-president Takeshita 
Nobm・uin 1987. Within the Takeshita faction， criticism against 
Ozawa's arbitrary leadership intensified. While the anti-Ozawa 
group recommended Obuchi Keizo， former Secretary General of 
雪 the Cabinet， as the chair of Take叫山 f仏act似iωO叩1 to succeed 
主 Ka問問-u，the Ozawa group pushed ther 。HataTsutomu. At the general meeting of the faction in October， 
Obuchi was e!ected after all. Quite dissatisfied with such a 
result， Hata and Ozawa's group immediately organized a group 
(56)“Roso tono aratana rentai 0 mezashite: A.kamatsu Hirotaka Rodo 
Kyokucho ni kiku，" Gekkan Shakaito， 92/12， p. 63-68 
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called “Reform Forum 21，" which 
inevitable. 
There had been three controversial issues dividing the LDP 
even before this event. The first issue concerned the LDP's 
relation with the opposition: should the LDP seek cooperation 
with the largest opposition party the JSP? Or， should it pursue 
closer ties with the Komeito and the DSP whose policy stances 
were closer to those of the LDP's? The second issue was a 
problem of how to place presentday Japan in the new context of 
international political economy. The third issue was related to 
political reform: should the party support the majoritarian 
(57) system or not? 'i.JI J These deepening rifts on the one hand and the 
antagonism between the Ozawa and the anti-Ozawa groups on 
the other deeply affected in the LDP. When the constructors' 
scandals were revealed in 1993 and Kanemaru was arrested in 
March for his alleged violation of the income tax law， the LDP 
was driven to the edge. The party was forced to initiate the 
move for political reform in order to survive at al. 
On December 24， 1992， the Socialist leader Tanabe Makoto 
expressed his intention to resign. When asked by the press if 
growing criticism for his close relationship to Kanemaru Shin 
was the decisive factor for his resignation， he said:“It is not the 
，(58) case at al."''OJ It appeared clear， however， that the Kanemaru 
problem led to Tanabe's resignation. Yet， since Tanabe himself 
expressed that he wished “to hand over the baton to a younger 
leader，" he realized that a generational renovation was actually 
(59) needed. ''J Thus in one sense， Tanabe's resignation opened the 
door for a drastic reform by up and coming young leaders. In 
fact， the Japanese electorate was continuously frustrated with 
made the split of the LDP 
(57) Kitaoka Shinichi， 1995. ]iminto: Seikento削 38nen.Tokyo: Yomiuri 
Shinbun-sha. p. 250. 
(58) Mainichi shinbun， December 25， 1992. 
(59) Tanabe Makoto. 1993. “Tanabe Makoto Shakaito Iincho no ji 
hyomei: atarasi kaikaku to sedai kotai no ketsui，" Gekkan Shakaito， 
93/2， pp. 6-9. 
the situation in which there appeared no alternative to 
ongoing political corruption. The existing regime rested on a 
structure in which the bureaucrats kept their vested interests 
firmly tied to the Liberal Democratic MPs who cultivated money 
and votes from the businesses who supported them. This was 
merely one party control and a malignant triangle of politicians. 
capitalists-bureaucrats. New political leaders， therefore， were 
expected not only to reform their own party， but also to break 
such a mechanism completely in order to establish an entirely 
different democratic system. 
Under the leadership of newly elected socialist leader 
Yamahana Sadao， the JSP was preparing for the “Declaration of 
1993" that would replace the 1986 Declaration. The latter 
Declaration was said to be Social Democratically oriented. It did 
not， however， clearly use the word Social Democracy. Above al， 
it stil assumed the Cold-War structure was stil in existance. 
There was no shared understanding of Social Democracy， nor 
was there recognition that Western European Social Democracy 
itself was faced with an impasse. Furthermore， collecting Social 
Democratic forces was not sufficiently strong a strategy for 
those who tried to take office owing to a shortfall in the number 
of seats. Rather a project to inc1ude the liberal and reformist 
camps was seriously pursued in political scenes. For young 
Socialist MPs， the European Social Democrats， the LDP's liberal 
factions and the Clinton Democrats appeared so similar that they 
(60) could not distinguish between them. 
The first thing that should be clarified in the process of 
political realignment was what on which kind of ideology these 
newly organized parties and political forces would be based. 
While for better or worse， Ozawa Ichira c1ear1y showed one 
(61) kind of ideology， ¥U>) other forces did not show any kind of 
the 
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(60)“93 nen Sengen wa do arubekika: Kubo Wataru， Tsutsui Nobutaka， 
Okazaki Tomiko taidan，" Gekkan Shakaito， 93/5， p. 6.23. 
(61) Ozawa Ichiro. Nih側 KaizoKeikaku. 
ideological foundation. The concept of Social Democracy that the 
JSP wanted to realize was too European for Japanese electorates 
to understand. The JSP proclaimed “A New Social Democracy" 
that would tackle the newly emerging problems of women， 
en vironment， Third World， and the universalization of human 
rights. (62) Nonetheless， a realization of a more advanced “New 
Social Democracy" seemed simply infeasible in J apan which 
(63) lacked even the traditional Social Democratic practice. ¥00} If 
Social Democracy existed at al in Japan， itdid only within the 
intellectuals' ideology. Additionally， the relationship between the 
Japanese political parties and unions， too， did dot share common 
factors with European Social Democracy in which， theoreticaIly， 
political bargaining between unions and managers not only 
affected wages and working conditions but also forged a social 
norm of the welfare state trusted by electorates. (64) 
Toward the Birth of a Coalition 'Government 
On June 18， 1993， a non-confidence vote on the Miyazawa 
Cabinet passed the Lower House. Despite Prime Minister 
Miyazawa Kiichi's public declaration to pass the political reform 
biIl within the same session of the Diet， he was forced to 
relinquish it at the end of the session because of the stiff 
resistance on the part of the anti-reform factions of the LDP. 
Three opposition parties， the JSP， the Komeito， the DSP placed a 
non-confidence vote on the order of the House on June 17. The 
vote was passed the next day. Miyazawa immediately decided to 
dissolve the Diet. Thus， Miyazawa became the last prime ?
(62) Sumizawa Hiroki. 1993. “Atarashii Shakaiminshushugi to Soi 0 六
hatajirushi ni，" GekkaηShakaito， 93/5， p. 35-46 
(63) Magara Hideko. 1995. "ltaria saha seito no henyo: posto-shamin no c 
shiten kara，" paper presented at the ]apan Political Science 
Association. Octob巴r1995 
(64) !、JakazawaTakao. 1993.叩 nenyori gutaisei 0， mongon yori oyak巴no
giron 0: 93 nen Sengen giron ni yosete，" Gekkan Shakaito， 93/8， p. 
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minister under the LDP's one party dominance regime， and Japan 
entered into a new era of coalition governments. 
The energy required to destroy the one party regime that 
had been in power for almost 40 years was tremendous. (65) 
Immediately after the non-confidence vote was passed， ten 
Liberal Democratic MPs belonging to the young reformist group 
led by Takemura Masayoshi submitted letters of secession to 
LDP's secretary general Kajiyama Seiroku. On June 21， they 
raised the banner of a new party called Shinto Sakig，αke (New 
Party Harbinger). Though one step behind the Takemura group， 
44 MPs of Hata and Ozawa's group， too， left the LDP on June 22， 
and organized a new party Shinseito (Japan Renewal Party) on 
June 23. 
The pretext of Hata and Ozawa's new party building was 
political reform. Ozawa and others called themselves reformist， 
labeling those who remained in the LDP anti-reformist. The most 
direct motive， however， for Ozawa and others to leave the LDP 
was their recognition that they themselves could not survive 
politically without splitting the LDP to establish a new camp 
outside the LDP. (66) Kamei Shizuka， a member of the group 
labeled anti -reformist， said:“The LDP's fal from office was 
certainly due to the growing criticism of the party's persistent 
plutocracy. Yet Hata and Ozawa used to be the heart of these 
plutocratic practices. They lost in the factional conflict and if 
they had remained in the LDP they would become powerless. 
The LDP is an amalgamation of factions. Ozawa and others 
agreed to the non-confidence vote calculating that the LDP would 
(65) For an argument on the uncertainty and unpredictability during the 
period of transition， see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. 
Schmitter. 1986. Transition to Democracy: Political Life after 
Authoritarian Rule. Johns Hopkins University Press. Although this 
context is different from Japan's case where regime changes occur 
within a democratic framework. 
(66) Shiratori Rei， eds. 1995.抑制kyokuseide Seiji仰 donaru初.Tokyo: 
Liberty Shobo. 
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have to leave office if they left the LDP and that by creating an 
(67) " opposition party they could take office instead. 
Rengo's Yamagishi， who had promoted political realignment 
from the unions' side and had assisted with the breakdown of 
LDP's one party control of government， was one of the architects 
of a coalition government. He shared the same view on Ozawa's 
behavior as Kamei's:“I guess that Ozawa was obsessed by an 
intense fear that he could not survive without leaving the LDP 
to establish a new government.… Such a misgivings might be 
shared by al the present executives of the Sh仰sh伽to(New 
Frontier Party)， but I could easily imagine that Ozawa's anxiety 
must be the strongest， since he was at the very core of the 
Kanemaru-Takeshita-Ozawa regime ripe with plutocratic 
corruption." (68) For Yamagishi， Ozawa' s assertion about political 
reform seemed simply to be a pretense to leave the LDP in order 
to return to office. Political reform might be a mere excuse and 
Ozawa might utilize it because at that time it was the most 
(69) popular word. 
The General Election on July 18， 1993 can be defined as“a 
switch within the opposition camps in which the progressive 
Socialists retreated and a conservative opposition emerged.，(70) 
This suggested a possibility that Japan's politics thereafter 
would turn into a two conservative party system. The seats 
obtained by each party broke down into the LDP's 223， the JSP's 
70， Sh伽seito's55， Komeito's 51， Nihon Sh仰to's35， the DSP's 15， 
Sαkigake's 13， Shaminren's 4， the JCP's 15， and others' 30 seats. 
In the non・LDPcamp， three new parties won overwhelming 
victories， but the JSP reduced its number of seats to half 
???????
(67) Shiota Ushio. 1996. Ichi.Ryu即 Hagishiri.Tokyo: KK Best Selers. 
pp.35.36. 
(68) Yamagishi Akira. 1995. Renritsu Shikakenin. Tokyo: Kodansha， p. 
15-16. 
Ibid.， p.30. 
Kobayashi Yoshiaki. 1993.“Haiin bunseki kara mita sonzai riyu no 
ayausa，" Gekkan Shakaito， 93/9， p.21. 
(69) 
(70) 
compared to the previous election. Owing to the crucial rift 
between the JSP and the DSP over the PKO problems， Social 
Democratic cooperation proved to be totally out of date. 
Although the Nihon Shinto and Shinto Sakig，αke finally joined in 
the anti-LDP government after al， the hesitation to participate in 
the non-LDP camp Hosokawa Morihiro and Takemura Masayoshi 
demonstrated immediately after the election revealed the 
structural vulnerability of the new government. Hosokawa and 
Takemura， who wanted to hold the casting vote until the last 
moment， embraced a scenario of a grand coalition with the LDP 
headed by Gotoda Masaharu. (71) 
“A non-LDP government will be created if the LDP does not 
reach 240 seats." As Ozawa predicted during the electoral 
campaign， the LDP could not attain a majority. The five 
opposition parties had implicitly made an agreement beforehand 
that in such a case prime minister should come from the 
conservative camp. There was a strong resistance within the 
JSP， however， to share office with Hata and Ozawa who had 
belonged to the allegedly most corrupt LDP faction led first by 
Tanaka and then by Takeshita. Yet JSP's chair Yamahana and 
its secretary-general Akamatsu persuaded the intraparty 
opposition to form a non-LDP coaIition government:“We do not 
want to neglect the Ozawa problems， but isn't it more important 
to set up a non-LDP government?" 
This is when the JSP made its fataI decision， however. The 
first clause of the coalition partners' agreement said that they 
四 would promote the electoral reform based primarily on a 
majoritarian system. The JSP had been insisting on a 
三 proportionalrepresentation system. The JSP was forced into a 
六 truly heavy compromise in order to establish a non.LDP 
coalition government. The majoritarian system that seemed to 
work against the JSP might well be its “one-way ticket for 
(71) Uchida Kenzo. 1993.“Renritsu-ha to shimin-ha no togo nashini mirai 
wa nai，" Gekkan Shakaito， 93/9， p. 25-26. 
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Hell." (72) 
The 1993 election in which the JSP suffered an historical 
defeat， showed that labor unions' political consciousness and 
their pattern of party-support were drastically changing. Unions 
used to support the progressive parties. Under the leadership of 
the JC (Kinzokurokyo or Japan Council of Metal Worker' Unions)， 
however， they decided to break the traditional pattern of 
supporting the JSP and DSP and began supporting the three new 
parties， Nihon Shinto， Shinseito， and Sakigake instead. This was a 
historical shift. Conversely， the Zendentsu excluded the eight 
leftwing Socialist candidates who were officially adopted by the 
JSP from its list of recommendations. The Tekkororen， too， 
excluded three such candidates. They resorted the selective 
recommendation‘ In fact， the conservatization of unions had 
already been largely promoted. Even before the birth of the 
Rengo， the political preference of union members of major 
tansα削 hadchanged. For instance， the Tekkororen， which once 
supported the JSP and the DSP， mentioned the LDP as the most 
important player in a 1984 survey. The Hyogo district in the 
1993 election was symbolic of this change. The Tekkororen 
switched its support from JSP ex-chair Doi Takako to Nihon 
Shinto's Koike Yuriko. Ironically， however， Tekkororen's 
withdrawal from the Doi camp directed citizens' sympathy 
・(73)toward Doi. 
The eight non-LDP parties， the JSP， Shinseito， Komeito， Nihon 
Shinto， DSP， Sαkigake， Shaminren， and M仰shukaikαkuRengo 
publicly declared on July 29 that they were prepared to 
recommend Hosokawa Morihiro as their candidate for Prime 
Minister at the Special Session of the Diet. On August 7， 1993， 
Hosokawa Morihiro was confirmed Prime Minister by 262 votes 
to 224 in the Lower House. 
The rise of Hosokawa， who came from an old daimyo family 
Yamaghishi Akira. Renritsu Shikakenin. p. 76. 
Shukan Toyo Keizai. July 31， 1993， pp. 22-23. 
(72) 
(73) 
dating back 700 years， verified that“Japan， a peaceful and 
democratic state， stil admired the nobility. (74)" Hosokawa 
instantly intoxicated J apanese voters and easily painted a 
picture in which the LDP equaled the bad guys and the anti-LDP 
equaled the good guys. At first glance， Hosokawa looked like an 
anti-Liberal Democrat. He gained short-term success in making a 
clean image by advocating political reform. Nonetheless， he 
lackecl a deeper ideology， long-term perspective， knowledge and 
enthusiasm for policy. It was soon reveaJed that he， in fact， was 
a person who simply stuck to superficial appearance ancl 
(7:') styles. 
Within barely a month since the start of the Hosokawa 
government， the JSP had to hold an extra congress to elect new 
executives. Isolatecl by a stiff cartel by Ozawa， Komeito's 
Ichikawa， and DSP's Yonezawa at the Party Representatives' 
Meeting of the government which was composed of Secretary司
Generals and Presiclents of each coalition party， the Socialist 
Secretary目GeneralAkamatsu expressecl his intention to resign 
(71i) his post. ¥"'J The socialist chair Yamahana， too， resigned after 
only eight months in office. 
At the Congress of September 1993， MlIrayama Tomiichi 
took the post of Socialist chair， while the experiencecl KlIbo 
Wataru was elected Secretary-General to counter Ozawa ancl his 
cronies. Murayama's stance within the coalition government was 
cle旦r:“Peopleargue too much about a two conservative party 
system and a two party system， while Prime悶inisterHosokawa 
advocates a moderate multi-party system.…1 feel sympathy wIth 
四 Prime Minister's moderate multi-party system. …It seems 
J¥ 
implausible that only two conservative parties could represent 
ancl respond to today's diversified and pluralistic demands of the 
citizen日. .. We fel that the conservative argument of a two 
conservative party system seems to contain some factors of 
(71)γase Yasuhir・o.1995. Sori 1ωZαTokyo: Bungei Shunju Sha. p. 113. 
(75) lbid.. p. 117. 
(76) Yamaghishi Akira. Renritsu Shikιたω1I1l.pp. 161-166. 
authoritarian politics rather than democratic politics. 1 think we 
must not place the State above the Nation and political parties. 1 
fel it is dangerous to argue for strengthening the function of the 
state in the face of the existing demands for 
decentralization. (77)" Nonetheless， the situation for the JSP was 
quite critical. D巴spitethe present rift between the LDP and 
Shinseito， their policy-stances wer巴 almostthe same. Thus， the 
JSP feared that a hugεgroup of conservative liberals might be 
organized contrary to its Social Democratic and Libcral project， 
if the leaders changed. The JSP thus needed a f1exible but 
maneuverable strategy to attract the liberals to its own side 
(78) rather than to the consεrvatives. 
These liberals may correspond to the PPI (p，αltito Popola1旬
Italiarω) in ltalian politics. Yet the distinction between the 
conservative left and conservative right in ltaly became clear 
since ex-DC leftist， ceηtro， formed a new party called the PPI， 
while the ex-DC r均 htist臼ssplit to form the CCD (Centケ的r仰"0Cr“tωstμα n 
Democraαtμtωciωi). In ]apan's case， the日ituationwas more cumplicated 
because the liberals and the conservati ves stil co-existed within 
the LDP. 
M吋oritarianismand Backwardness of Ozawa's Scenario 
The ncw electoral system was composcd of the 300 seats for 
Majoritarian constituencies and the 200 seats for Proportional 
Rεpresentation districts. As long as the system retained 
Proportional Representation districts where seats were 
distributed according to the shares of votes by each party， small 
parties stil had the possibility to survi ve 班orωver，as the 型
British Liberal Party indicated， a thiγd force could enter into the 0 
political market even under the purely majoritarian systm 元
(77) Murayama Tomiichi. 1993. “Renritsu seiken to Shakaito no 
yakuwari: hl、iwa，kankyo， jinken 0 jiku ni scnmei na日onzaiishiki 0，" 
Gekkan Shakaito， 9:i/12. p. 19-20. 
(78) Shinohara Hajime. 1993 “Yawarakaku hirogari no aru gokento no 
michi 0，" Gekkan Shakaito， 93/9， p.10. 
What maUered most was the fact that the Majoritarian system 
itself could not appropriately respond to the diversified needs of 
advanced society. The rise of Green parties and Regional parties 
in Europe precisely indicated this. Ozawa Ichiro， the advocator 
of majoritarianism， emphasized his own modern rationality. The 
backwardness of ]apanese politics， however， was revealed 
precisely by the fact that Ozawa's idea， which was out of date 
from a global perspective， appeared fresh in ]apan's political 
(79) scene. 
As was the case in Italy， ]apan's post-war political 
institutions contained various measures to prevent the 
centralization of power due to the bitter experience of war-time 
totalitarianism. Th巴Italianpure PR syst民emwas a protωotype， and 
]apan's med出i山um consti社tuency syst伐em shared common 
characteristics with the PR syst伐em.Yet thεse syst伐emslacked 
strong le白凶3交沼a【der巴.マ.守叶5
cl日ientelismto prevail. 
In such a context， itwas not unusual that Ozawa claimed in 
his book Nihon Kaizo Kei加わtpublished in 1993 that introducing 
the majoritarian system and strengthening the role of leaders 
would break the stalemate of ]apanese politics by cre且ting
dynamism.“明le]apanese have been practicing the politics of 
collective irresponsibility because we were too nervous about 
the centralization of power. I have to say， however， that such 
politics are not at al compatible with the concept of modern 
democracy. I think that a truly democratic power can only be 
realized by making clear the rule of government alternation， 
through the compctition of party policies， and by clarifying 
" (80) political responsibility." '0"/ Furthermore he said: “Too rigid a 
concept of proportional representation hinders political 
clynamism. Proportionalism is justified in that it givcs minority 
parties opportunities to express their opinions.…. As a result， 
?????
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Uchida Kenzo. Seiji Retsuretsu. pp‘118-119. 
Ozawa Ichiro. 1993. Nihon Kaizo Keikaku. p. 27. 
(79) 
(80) 
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decision句makingtakes too much time and is hardly realized 
because of strong pressures to maintain the status quo…What 
kind of electoral system can recover political leadership and 
dynamism? 1 have been proclaiming an introduction of 
r_.. ____.._ ，(81) 
ma]ontanan system tor years. 
Ozawa， who had controlled the LDP in a plutocratic manner 
but was losing his power which he had obtained by money， 
wanted to concoct a logical reason through which he could 
legitimatize the centralization of power in a dimension different 
from the one created by money alone. This was his assertion of 
strong leadership. His stance was time-worn， however， and 
looked like merely an adaptation of Neo-Conservatism. In ltaly， 
also， former prime minister Bettino Craxi's campaign of 
governαbilita and his consequent appeals for strengthening the 
power of President clearly contained many overtones of the 
1980s， including Thatcherism and Reaganism. A crisis of Japan's 
politics demonstrated precisely that Ozawa's backwardness was 
not recognized. 
Ozawa's scεnario of political reform did not take into 
consideration the corruption of the LDP. It just emphasized the 
necessity of a new institutional framework which would enable 
Japan to respond appropriately to the changing international 
context as a major power. It was a necessary step， therefore， for 
Ozawa to crush the JSP， a major obstacle to realizing his own 
scenario. As long as the JSP maintained a certain political 
power， it was impossible to realize a two conservative party 
system. Yet a West European style confrontation between the 
Conservatives and the Socia! Democrats was not acceptable for 
him. Ozawa's scenario， thus， aimed at destroying the JSP through 
the process of political reform by creating a two conservative 
party system. His scenario was supported by Japanese business 
(82) lεaders 
(81) Jbid.， p.68 
(82) Watanabe Osamu. Seijiλωkaku to J(ent1 Kaisei: Nakasone Yasuhiro 
た'araOzawa Jchiro e， p. 418.434. 
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The Collapse of the Hosokawa Government and the JSP's 
Secession from the Coalition 
The political reform laws were approved on January 29， 
1994， after much deliberation. It was a difficult choice for the 
JSP， which had insisted on proportional representation， to 
approve an electoral system based mainly on majoritarianism. 
The JSP reluctantly approved this measure in order to avoid the 
possibility of LDP's return to office by coopting even the 
centrists of the non.LDP coalition. The JSP agreed to the 
electoral reform in order to terminate the LDP government and 
to secure its own influence by participating in th巴 coalition
government. (83) There was a distinct possibility， however， for 
the JSP to lose power due to the introduction of majoritarianism 
that would lead to a Japanese two conservative party system. 
The situation also looked gloomy for Prime Minister 
Hosokawa who fascinated the Japanese electorates by anti.LDP 
campaigns and appeals for reform. There was a growing 
apprehension concerning his lack of substance: he had no 
philosophy and ideology and was interested only in visual 
images of the mass media. Since he was not accustomed to 
government administration， he could not help seeking Ozawa's 
assistance. His government， therefore， became more conservative 
almost overnight. Although he managed to pass the political 
reform bills， his abrupt proposition of the Welfare Tax and its 
immediate withdrawal as well as his failure in the Cabinet 
reform disgraced his fresh clean image. His government now 
seemed almost authoritarian. 
On April 8， Prime Minister Hosokawa suddenly intimated 
his intention to resign， which surprised his followers. His 
pretense of democratic reform was found false because of his 
failure in the Welfare Tax problem as well as Sagawa's 100 
million Yen donation. On April 22， the coalition partners reached 
??????
tSllikyu 。nn巴nfllmae 。(83) Kllbo Watarll. 1994. "Ippo zenshin 
sitslzukerl，" Gekkan Shakaito， p.17 
a consensus on basic policies about the second-term coalition 
government which demanded heavy concession on the part of the 
JSP. The leaders of each party signed a “Consensus on 
establishing a new government." The socialist chair Murayama 
proposed Shinseito's leader Hata Tsutomu for the candidate for 
the next premier. The other leaders， too， agreed that the next 
Prime Minister should be Mr. Hata. On April 25， in both Lower 
and Upper Houses Mr. Hata was appointed to be prime minister. 
In the several hours between the nomination of the prime 
minister and the planned Cabinet meeting， the JSP was forced 
(84) out of office. ¥0'" The Socialist leader Murayama and secretary-
general Kubo were waiting for the newly elected Prime Minister 
to invite them to an executive meeting to discuss Cabinet-
building which was supposed to occur around 4 : 00pm， but the 
meeting was not called even after 6 : 00 pm. Unfortunately， 
Kubo realized for watching TV that al the coalition partners 
except for the JSP were creating a new unified party. 
The fact was that the DSP's leader Ouchi Keigo induced 
Nihon Shi“抑4α仰ntめδ.'sHosokawa and Shi仰t伽?仰tseit初o'sOzawa tωo form a unified 
par吋tycalled K，α4ぬωsh仰 (，‘“'Innova抗叫tiぬO∞nが1ピ，). 
the LDP w附eregoing to join this new party. Without consulting 
the JSP， they reported the formation of a new 130 members' new 
party， Kaishin， at 8 : 00pm， and the Lower House Secretariat， 
which was supposed to be closed at this time， received this 
report. At last， Hata called the party leaders meeting， but the 
conditions for the Cabinet-making had already changed 
drastically. Now， the new party Kaishin with 130 members 
became the biggest group， while the Komeito had 52 members，塑
and the JSP had 74 members. There was no dissonance between 六
Komeito and Kaish仰 sincethey had a mutual understanding 堕
already. The JSP， however， was completely isolated and received 
(84) The following description is based on Kubo Wataru. 1994.“Renritsu 
seiken ridatsu! Sosite Shakaito wa nani 0 mezasunoka?"， Gekkan 
Shakaito， 94/6， p. 6.19. 
no information. 
This series of moves revealed the fact that the conservative 
camp within the government wanted to weaken the position of 
the JSP by forming a group bigger than it. The conservative 
forces did this within the several hours between the premier 
nomination and the Cabinet-building because they wanted to 
isolate the JSP. As a matter of fact， Kaishin included the newly 
formed Liberal Party headed by Kakizawa Koji who had just left 
the LDP without JSP's approval of them becoming a coalition 
partner. Now that the basic conditions for a coalition 
government had been lost and in particular the partners' mutual 
trust was seriously hurt， the JSP decided to leave office at 1 : 00
am， on January 26. 
A Process toward the LDP-JSP Coalition Government 
An argument continued within the JSP over whether it 
should demand a general resignation of the Hata government or 
whether it should seek a dissolution of the Diet and a general 
election. The Socialist left wanted to bring back the medium 
constituency system and to demand a dissolution of Lower House 
since it feared if the majoritarian system were put in place then 
the JSP would disappear. The Socialist right wanted to return to 
office and realize a Socialist.led coalition government again after 
the spontaneous general resignation of the Hata Cabinet. In other 
words， this confrontation was an in-party conflict between Kubo 
and Yamahana's group aiming at returning to the non-LDP 
coalition， and Murayama's group seeking an alliance with the 
LDP and Sakigake. 
At this time， the LDP submitted a non-confidence vote of the 
Hata Cabinet to the Lower House on June 23. Before this move， 
the seemingly more advantageous Socialist right was expected to 
rejoin the coalition government's policy consultation. 
Nonetheless， immediately after the LDP's submission of a non-
confidence vote， Ozawa requested that the LDP president Mori 
Yoshiro consider making an alliance with his group. This shook 
??????
the JSP to their foundation. Ozawa's group wanted to forrn a 
conservative-conservative alliance， but the LDP rejected his 
advances and leaked this inforrnation to the JSP. “How 
irnpertinent of Ozawa to play both sides of the fence!" The 
furious Socialist left turned offensive， and pressures for the 
Hata Cabinet's general resignation again increased. In addition， a 
call for “Prirne Minister Murayarna" encouraged the Socialist 
left. The Socialist right's scenario to return to thE、coalition
government was blocked and the trend toward the alliance 
(85) between the LDP， JSP and Sαkigake becarne decisive. 
Rengo's Yamagishi wanted to maintain the anti-LDP 
governrnent by letting the JSP and Sakigαke return to the old 
coalition and thereupon weakening the influence of the 
authoritarian group led by Ozawa. The neo-conservative group 
of Shinseito's Ozawa and Komeito's Ichikawa was c10sely related 
to the MOF (Ministry of Fina町ど) thro時 hthe back door 
Ozawa's real airn was a Liberal Dernocratic split. Yamagishi， 
who fully recognized al this， expected a formation of Social 
Dernocratic and Liberal camp. The fact， however， was that the 
JSP lacked an organizational strategy to realize such a 
convergence， and the DSP did not have any such intentions. 
Yamagishi thought that the LDP was rnerely a special interest 
group representing central and local capitalists. Thus， he felt 
that the LDP did not fit workers' interest after al， although 
sorne Liberal thought could be found in the LDP. For Yarnagishi， 
who thought the only way to destroy such a huge group was to 
keεP it out frorn the process of the budget compilation， an 
alliance of the LDP and the JSP was necessary simply for 胃
helping the former survive. (86) 両
Unlike Ya同凶 whokept his distance frorn Ozawa，叩耐空
Rengo unionists like secretary-general Washio Etsuya and the 
(85) Suzuki Toichi. 1995. Nagatacho Tairan 2: Seiji Kenryo仇~ 110 Iokai. 
Tokyo: Kodansha， p. 278 .280 
(86)“Ji-Sha renritsu ni honro sareru Rcngo，" Ekο仰 misuto，August 9， 
1994， p. 58-59. 
JC-related union leaders were establishing a close relationship 
with Shinseito_ 1n fact， they were completely different from 
Yamagishi. From Shiηseito's side， also， the Secretary-General of 
the Cabinet Kumagai and Shinseito's director of policy bureau 
Funada Hajime frequently contacted the Rengo executives. Under 
the new majoritarian electoral system they could continue to rely 
on money and organizational networks. Unions which possessed 
both of these were a target for Ozawa and his followers to 
L ・ム (87) aCllleve reCrtllt 
A coalition government of the LDP and the JSP suffered 
harsh criticism mainly from Ozawa and Hosokawa's advisors 
who insisted that such a coalition was merely a reaction to 
(88) reforms and a return to the old regime. ¥00; On the other hand， 
there was an opposite view which claimed that the coalition 
government of the LDP， ]SP and Sαkigαke was a necessary act to 
prevent a series of political reforms from resulting in merely th巴
ー (89)neo-conservative dominance by Shinseito and Komeito. ¥0") 1n any 
case， itwas clear to everyone that the traditional conservatives 
of the LDP who dragged down the old regime and the neo倒
conservatives of Shinseito wearing the mask of political reform 
were strengthening their influence in th巴 process of the 
transition to a new system_ The JSP was forced into an even 
more clifficult position. 
JSP's biggest problem was that they lacked the rule of 
reform in creating a new political order that would replace the 
LDP's one party dominance. 80th the parties and the politicians 
were interested only in their own survival. They had not yet left 
悶 theold regime completely. Above al， they lacked the self-
consciousness， courage， and the spirit of mutual concession， the 
雪 m州 nec附 aryfactors in the period 0ぱftran仙
ノ、
(87) Ibid.， p. 59. 
(8) For instance，日eSasaki Takeshi's comment. Yomiuri Shinbun， ]une 
30， 1994 
(89) Yamaguchi ]iro‘ 1994. "]i-Sha no mi 0 kezuru kaikaku de sengo seiji 
ni kakki 0，" GeJdian Shakaito， 94/8， p. :iO-34. 
Whether or not the LDP and the SPD could reach a 
consensus concerning the problems of the Constitution， the 
Security Treaty / Self Defense Forces， and the problem of 
Japan's national flag and song HinomαruぉKimigayo，over which 
both of them had had many conflicts drew people's attention in 
J une 1994. It was the Socialist side that settled such misgi vings. 
On July 20， the JSP's “historical shift" that Prime Minister 
Murayama made contain吋 thefollowing resolutions: (1) Se1f. 
Defcnse Forccs wcre acceptablc under Article 9 of the 
Constitution， (2) the Japan.US Security Treaty was imperative， 
(3) the Jfin01仰 ruand Kimigayo had already bcen broadly 
legitimized by the citizens， and (4) the disan配 dncutrality 
policy had no morピ functionafter the breakdown of the Cold 
War structure. The deep rifts between the two parties with 
respect to national defense， diplomatic policies and education 
had been painlessly neutralized. 
This drastic reversal on the JSP pact which had historically 
located its raison d'etre in disarmed neutrality was a 
premonition of the party's demise. In fact， there were fatal 
defects in this radical policy shift. First， itwas so opportunistic 
that it lacked leadership and initiative， and second， the party 
was neither prepared to have a new ideology rεplacing the 
disarmed neutrality argument nor capable of collecting new 
political forces. Without a clear vision of future， the JSP 
(91) completely lost its strategic objects and identity. 
If the JSP had any opportunity to show its raison d'etre 
even after making such a radical compromise concerning its 
basic policies， itcould be found in the field of administrative 四
reform and economic policies. Japan's economy was suffering 
from a 10時ー termstructural recession which was fu吋 a附問ly 空
different from its cyclical ones. Land prices suddenly dropped. 
The seniority system and life.time employment were 
(90) Iwami Tak司o.1995. Meiso Kenryoku. Tokyo: Asahi Sonorama. p. 138. 
(91) Maruyama Hiroyuki. 1994. "Shakaito daitenkan: Murayama Shusho 
no kiken na kake"， Ek01wmisulo， August 9，1994， p.64. 
deteriorating， while the unemployment rate was skyrocketing. 
People increasingly feared the sinking of the ]apanese economy， 
and recognized that it was necessary to reform drastically the 
split infrastructure of ]apan's post-war capitalism in order to 
overcome such a crisis. The necessity of promoting a structural 
reform became a national norm， yet it was clear that promoting 
such a reform would not be an easy task. Most industries had 
been enjoying vested interests. It was very possible that the 
bureaucrats and conservative politicians who were deeply linked 
to these interests would strongly resist such a reform movement. 
The ]SP was too mused in its own problems to respond to 
such a reform. Without proposing effective policies that would 
reflect the citizens expectations i.e.， liberalization of ]apan's 
economy for the citizens by radically changing the old 
bureaucratic institutions， it contrarily too easily allowed a 
typical conservative， post-Fordist response: rationalization 
according to the capitalists' logic -the justification of massive 
personnel cuts. Nikkeiren's chairman Nagano declared in 
November 1993 at his organization's executive conference that 
managers would promote rationalization further by stressing 
that the estimated in-company unemployment was 1.6 to 2.2 
million and that the unemployment rate would reach 5 to 6%. In 
1994， the waves of rationalization entered into a new phase. 
Rationalization in the sectors of part-time workers， external 
workers and foreign workers had already been completed， 
and rationalizi時 full司time，regular workers (むIII町cl凶 III
while-collar workers， female workers， and aged workers) 
凶 wasproceeding. 
四 Yamagishi's Retirement and Further Conservatization of J¥ 
'-' Unions 
There were both pro and contro to the Murayama 
government in the opinion of the Rengo. Those tαnsans which 
supported the Murayama government such as Jichiro and 
Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers' union) had a large number of 
??
?
???
politicians who belonged to the Socialist left or Socialist center 
at both the local and national levels. Since Ozawa's group had 
imposecl severe policy on thcm， they had keen hatred for his 
group and did not care whether the LDP， Shinseito ancl Komeito 
were their coalition partners. On the other hand， the unions of 
IMF-JC inclucling Tekk7JYoren and Denkirengo saw the Murayama 
government as an “anti-reform government" which had 
conservative stance on deregulation. They thought it was 
difficult for the export sector to raise wages because of the 
strong yen. The JCεxecutives， who thought that they should 
enhance workers' living conclitions by correcting differences in 
clomestic ancl overseas prices， shared opinions with the managers 
to a considerable extent. They wanted a strong leader叶1Iplike 
that of Ozaw乳'sthat coulc1 revitalize Japan's economy by a 
radical deregulation， and they recognizecl that the LDP. which 
had deeply committcd itself to the vestecl interests shared by 
politicians， bureaucrats and capitalists， no longer was able to 
L~~_ -.. ~.._ ~____ (92) break the stalemate of Japanese economy 
On October 6， 1994， at the Central Committee， the Rengo 
chose Ashida Jinnosuke as the chair succeeding Yamagishi. The 
relationship between the Rengo-related unions and political 
parties were divided into three groups: (1) one supporting the 
Mur司ayamagovernment， (2) one backing the Shinminshurengo 
(New Democratic Allia町 e)，and (3) one close to Shinshinto. The 
new chair Ashida followed the traditional Rengo's political 
stance， i.e.， the Rengo shoulcl leave policies of which party to 
support to each member union's clisposaI. In fact， itseemed quite 
clifficult for unions to make national blocks with their cohorts as 
they had in the past. It was estimated that the structural 
relationship in which unions influenced party activities would be 
lost although a loose cooperative rclationship betw巴enthe two 
scemed to remain. As a matter of fact， the unions themselves had 
already lost their power to force their members to participate in 
(92)“]i.Sha r巴nritsuni honro sareru Rengo，"ι、konomisulo，August 9， 
1994， p. 61-62 
(93) political activities. 
Yamagishi's retirement brought an end to the Socialist-
oriented labor movement. He was said to be the last "Sohyo-type" 
leader. The once called “JSP-Sohyo block，" which was composed 
of the Sohyo executives and in particular those of the public 
sector， made political activity their first priority， because they 
thought it was necessary to influence actively the government in 
order to enhance the working and li ving conditions of their 
members. 1n this respect， they were different from unions of the 
private sector whose concerns concentrated on collective 
bargaining. Yamagishi had deep affection for the JSP， yet this 
tended to elicit a reaction from the pro-DSP Yuaikαigi (Friendly 
Society) -related unions within the Rengo. 1n addition， some pro-
JSP unions hacl il feelings about the fact that the JSP， despite its 
drastic loss of seats at the 1993 election， participated in the 
coalition government with Ozawa's group which they believed to 
be as corrupt as the old LDP. In this situation， the collapse of 
the Hosokawa government， the total resignation of Hata Cabinet 
and the birth of the Murayama government gradually weakened 
Yamagishi's base. During the breakdown of the Hosokawa 
government， Yamagishi once triecl to builcl a LDP-JSP coalition 
His initiative， however， was blocked by three Rengo executives， 
Ashida， Washio， Tokumoto and never resumecl again. While 
labor movement grew more conservative， Yamagishi tried to 
keep pro-Socialist stance， yet the JSP itself split and Yamagishi's 
strategy出usfailed. 
After Yamagishi's retirement， the opportunistic Reng万
里 leaders，who were at least 10 years younger than Yamagishi， 
会 suchas secretary-general Washio Etsuya， saw their relationship 
きwithpolitical parties as m削 yfunctional， because they制附
(94) have any particular party-id巴ntification.'V"J Yamagishi's 
(93) Nakazawa Takao. 1994 “Tenkanki no seito to rodokumiai，" Gekkan 
Sh品kaito，94/6， pp. 32.33 
(94) Egami Sumio. 1994 “Ryudoka suru seikai to Ren同 notaio，" Gekkan 
Shakaito， 94112， pp. 62.69. 
retirement seemecl to clarify the tenclency that each unions 
woulcl behave accorcling to their own incliviclual organizational 
(95) interests at an inclustry or company level. ¥VJ/ It appearecl very 
possible that everything would return to the so-called “sanbetsu-
jiketsu" (self-cletermination of unions by industry) and that al 
union activities such as wage raising and political conflicts 
woulcl be clone on the industry basis. 1n a worcl， the Rengo 
seemed to regress to a“consociation" rather than a federation. It 
(96) was on the verge of an iclentity crisis‘ 
1n theory， unions are supposed to be capable of establishing 
value systems differentiatecl from those advocated by political 
parties and enterprises. In the process of restructuring labor 
movεments， unions might have been able to produce values 
different from those of corporate society that saw corporate 
(97) development as a national interest. ¥'') Nonetheless， unions did 
not pursue raclical liberalism or citizen叩orientedpolicies. Rather， 
unions became more closed and more conservative during a 
recession. According to Rengo's Secretary-General Washio 
Etsuya， the present unemployment is not serious at al， since 
those who are now unemployed are the female part目timeworkers 
and the aged. He says:“1 wonder why some take an outdated 
stance that you should preserve jobs that clearly became 
needless?" He revealed his capitalist-like beliefs when discussing 
the situation of white collar midclle management，“The mass 
production corporate system itself is faced with a stalemate. 
This system yielded a large number of surplus managers who 
have controlled production and sales at the company 
headquarters. 1 am sorry to say that the situation will be harder. 問
)¥ 
(95) Nakazawa Takao. 1994. '‘Kyoko no hokai: Yamagishi Rengo kaicho 五
tainin no shinjitsu，" Shitkaη Tiフ'yokeizai，September 24， 1994， p.43. 
(96)“Kyogikai shiki unei de sanbetsu jiketsu ni kaeru: Yamagishi Rengo 
jidai no shuen." Shul<an ioyo!?eizai， October 1， 1994， p. 60-63. 
(97) Nakazawa Takao. 1989.“Soshiki， chingin no Sohyo izon taishitsu wa 
kawaru ka: Shin Rengo hossoku go ni towar巴ru seisaku teiji 
noryoku，" Ekonomisuto， October 23，1989. p. 55. 
. 1 am a being cold-hearted because they have not cooperated 
with union activitie.s.…1 would like to say that they should 
stand by themselves. It is pretty annoying that they say the 
Rengo does not do anything for them." (98) If such a conservative 
view of the Rengo leader is taken into account， his phrase 
" (99) “toward citizen居orientedunions" '''1 sounds simply meaningless. 
Formation of a New Conservative Party and Delayed 
Creation of the Third Pole 
Meanwhile， Ozawa lchiro tried to make a big new party 
capable of beating the Murayama government of the LDP， JSP 
and Sakigake. He sought support of Tokumoto Teruhito， the chair 
of Jidoshαsoren， Ashida Jinnosuke， the then-chair of Zensendomei， 
Sasamoto Kiyoshi， the chair of Denηokusoren (Confederation of 
Electric Power-Related lndustry Workers' Unions of Japan)， and 
Ito Mototaka， the chair of Zentei. The four tansα1， leaders 
wanted to join the JSP and the DSP by involving the Socialist 
right first， and then let them join this new party. They wanted 
to wait and see what would happen with the JSP until December 
10， 1994， when Ozawa's new party was to be created. 
The JSP was divided into two groups: one was pro-
Murayama leaning center-Ieft， the other pro-Yamahana and Kubo 
was center-right. ln 1993， the Yamahana group organized aロin-
party group called the Democrats， but it had to suspend its 
activities because of the disorder caused by the LDP-JSP 
coalition四buildingwhen the Murayama government was created. 
ln August 1994 they finally managed to form Shinminshurengo 
四 (NewDemocratic Alliance). Yamahana ancl Kl山)hacl already 
七 requestedthe support of the leaders of 7 tαnsωIS， Zentei chair 
五
(98)“Ren只oWashio Etsuya jimukyokllcho li kiku: Rengo d乱t巴
nayandeiru，" Ronza. 95ill， pp. 145-146. 
(99) Washio Etsuya and Shinocla Toru. 1996ψ “Roclokllmiai， chiiki 
komYlll1iti， NPO ga shotokll 110 saibunpai kiko 0 bl日ltan:sono ishi 
kettei ni kumiai-in ga shimin to shite sanka surll koto月adaiji" Gekkan 
Shakaiminshu. 96i3， pp. 6-17. 
Ito， ]ohororen (]apan Federation of Telecommunications 
Electronic 1ぱormation and Allied W okers) chair Hashimoto 
Koji， Denryokusoren chair Sasamoto， Denkirengo chair Iwayama 
Yasuo， Tekkororen chair Eto Benichiro， Zensendomei chair Takagi 
Tsuyoshi， and ]idoshαsoren chair Takahashi Yoshio. Yamahana 
told them that his group intended to leave the ]SP first and then 
make a new Social Democratic party. 
Moreover， on October 1， in a press conference at the 
seminar by Yokomichi Takahiro， Governor of Hokkaido， and 
]ichiro chair Goto， Kubo Wataru expressed his views on the 
political realignment and electoral cooperation:“The ]SP， of 
course， does not intend to )011 Ozawa's new party. We will 
choose a new way. Our goal is to form an amalgamation of Social 
Democratic forces and Liberal forces. We are waiting for the 
right time for the birth of democratic liberal new party that 
would leacl you into the 21st century." He wantecl to run against 
the LDP ancl the Neo-Conservatives by establishing a new party 
that woulcl represent the interests of the working people and the 
conservative-liberal strata. This was the “Third Pole" project. 
The pro目Murayamagroup immediately rcactcd by saying， 
“Do you want to shake the government?" Kubo did not evcn 
consult Prime Ministcr Murayama about his new party project 
bcforehand. Goto Morishige， chair of pro-Murayama ]ichiro， 
criticized Yamahana:“1 wonder why the Shinminren did not ask 
for the participationof tile 540cialistcenter-left?"(100) 
Mcanwhilc， thc opposition parties speedcd up their 
preparation for organizing a new party， but several crises 
occurrecl. Thcre wa 日 an increas幻叩lf昭 pos泊叩5幻ilぬ州bi凶〉汁刈泌l出i社ty that K臼伽o初01tη問?
f W0111 【CIrett山l日r肉寸nto I此t日OWI1 0川)川n収ginalp】lace， that 1入Nih01η'~ Shi仰ntめδ wλN'0111d 子六z之
split， ancl t出ha抗tsome parts of the DSP would leave the allial1ce. 主
Yet Nihon Shint7! managcd to d issol ve i tseJ f on October 30 and as ~ 
did Shinseito 01 November 16. The DSP closed the door on its 34 
(100) The abovt' dcscriptiol1 is basecl 01 an article in Aera， Oclober 24， 
1994. p. 13.15. 
year history and Komeito， too， seceded. On December 10， a抗tlast， 
a new par吋tySh防in附tsh伽{仇仰?幻nto(New Frontier Party) was bo印r白
On January 17， 1995， 27 ShinmのLshurengomembers heaclecl 
by Yamahana Sadao and the other 3 MPs， including Kaieda 
Banri who had just left Nihon Shinto and then organized 
Minshushinto Club， attempted to establish a new party. 
Nonetheless， this move toward making a new party was 
disrupted by the Hanshin Earthquake that happenecl exactly on 
the same day as their annOllncement of their newly formed 
party. 
The biggest factor behind the failllre of organizing a party， 
however， was in that Shinminshurengo did not have the crucial 
timing necessary to establish the party because of its excessi ve 
dependence on unions' backing. As a matter of fact， Yamahana 
and the others were supposed to boldly start a new party to 
respond to the birth of Shinshinto in December 1994. Dεcember 
s巴emedthe deadline for Democratic Liberals' amalgamation， yet 
Yamahana's group could not reach it. Shinminshurengo included 
not only Socialist MPs but also ex-DSP and ex-Nihon Shinto MPs. 
Yamahana， however， could not utilize thesεnew forces. JSP's ex-
secretary-general Akamatsu talked about the reasons of such a 
failure:“The LDP's pressures on labor unions were terrible. It 
blackmailed the Zendeηtsu by hinting about the breakup of the 
NTT， and threatened the Zeηtei by alluding to the privatization 
of postal services. We sought to obey unions' direction so 
honestly that we were swung around by them. When unions' 
political fever broke， we Socialist politicians no !onger could go 
四，(101) back.' 
The key to political realignment was the direction of so-
高 calledThi吋 Pole.If its aim was r叫 y"Democratic L伽 al"
五
amalgamation including some liberal factions of the LDP and 
Shinshinto， itwould be able， beyond the Third Pole， to realize a 
bilateral日tructureof the Conservatives versus the Liberals. The 
(101) Shioda Ushio. Ichi.Ryu /w Jagishiri. p. 144-} H5. 
LDP wa日 nolonger monolithic. Kohno， Miyazawa and Gotoda 
could possibly become coalition partners. If so， the Liberals 
could expand even to include some parts of the Shinshinto and 
(102) ex-DSP， too. 
1n fact， various surveys indicated that the support for the 
neo-conservative Shinshinto and the old-conservative LDP was at 
most 40%， and 60% of voters were outside of the conservative 
camp. Even if und巴cidedvoters and the non.voters were taken 
into account， about 30% of voters were recognized as anti-
conservati ve. Yet it was clear that the JSP could not occupy the 
Third Pole， since the voters saw the JSP as an integral part of 
(103) the oId regime. 
At the same time， a very European concept of Social 
Democracy seemed infeasible. Japan has never had a mass base 
for Social Democratic thought. Labor movemεnts historically did 
not foster Social Democracy -they only nipped its bud. A 
process of various in-company welfare enhancements， such as 
company-housing， low interest company housing loan systems， 
spoiled the necessity for Social Democracy. Workers linked their 
whole liv叩ー tocompanies and thus lust the sense of universality 
and sociality. Therefore， itscemed a natural consequence that 
unions' movement lacked the concept of equity and social justice. 
1n Japan's context in which unions and corporate activities are 
not in conflict， it seemcd quite difficult to develop Social 
Democracy，setting aSIde llberaiisIII-(104) 
??????Prime Minister Murayama's Resignation and A Party Name 
Change that Came Too Late 
The JSP issued its new basic policies and policy goals as the 
so-called 1995 Declaration on May 27， 1995 at the 62nd Extra 
(102) Uchida Kenzo. Seiji Retsul'etsu. p. 110-111町
(103) Taka日iIkuro. 1995. "Riberaru shinto no shinario日hiron，"Gelzkan 
Shalzaito， 95/4守 p.94.95. 
(104) Nakazawa Takao. 1994.“Tenkanki no seito to rodokumiai，" Gelzkan 
Shakaito， 94/6， pp目 33-:"34.
Congress. Nonetheless， in the 17th Upper IIouse election that 
took place on July 23， 1995， the JSP suffεred the worst 
. (105)， “historical defeat since the founding of the party・， The 
election itself was uninteresting. The voter turnout was lower 
than 50%. The electoral results showed that “the JSP was 
already a party of the past in an era of political realignment and 
coalitions." (106) Shinshinto obtained 12.5 million votes， the LDP 
11.1 million， the JSP 6.88 million， Sαkigαke 1.46 million. As 
these results ir凶 cated，the coming general election (Lower 
House) seemed to be a competition only between the 
conservative two poles， the LDP ancl Shinshinl7J. The JSP， 
therefore， hacl to transform itself into a new political force 
capable of getting 10 million votes. For this purpose， Kubo 
thought that the JSP日houldclissolve itsclf and make a totally 
(107) w party. 
While the JSP attemptccl to make the Thircl Pole by 
organizing a new Democratic Liberal party， some categories of 
voters were liberal， ancl so the Thircl Pole hacl already existed in 
voters' dimension. As a matter of fact， within Shinshinto's neo-
conservative faction composecl of Komeit7J， the DSP， Nihon Shinto， 
Shinseit7J， each party's supporters hated other parties. The 
voters of Nihon Sh仇t"o， DSP ancl Shinseito clid not like Komeito， 
( 108) and the voters of Nihon Shinm hated ShinseI{7J. 
The Murayama government seemed to bεlong-lasting， 
contrary to most expectations. The cooperation among the LDP， 
JSP and Sakigake barely continued. Thcre was 110 othcr force 
that could threaten the Murayama government in tcrms of the 
~! number of scats. Dcspite its dullness， the Murayama government 
二 seemeclto survive by inertia. On the other hancl， itwas also 
五 一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一一
f、 (105) Kubo Wataru. 1995“Shinlo koso wa iyoiyo mattanashi no shobu，" 
Gekkan Sh叫た白ito，95/5， p.6 
(106) Ibid.， p.10. 
(107) Ibiムpp.10-11
(10S) Kob礼yashiYoshiaki. 1995 “Yukensha no 日比乱 niwaDaisankyoku 
wa sudeni sonzai，" Gekkan Shakaito， 95/9. p. 76. 
plausiblc that Murayama would soon resign owing 
devastating defeat of the JSP in the June 1995 election. 
On January 5， 1996， Murayama declared that he would 
resign the post of Prime Minister. On January 11， the LDP's 
Hashimoto Ryutaro Cabinet started. JSP's reform leader Kubo 
Wataru joined the Cabinet as Vice Minister and Minister of 
Finance. Kubo's entry into the Cabinet， who had opposed to th巴
LDP-JSP coalition and repeatedly declared his intention to form 
a new anti-LDP party， poured cold water on the young Socialist 
MPs who wanted to make a new party. 
Retrospectively， the left-right confrontation came to the 
surface in respect to how the new party should be organized. 
The right wanted to build the core of the new party outside the 
JSP in which individual MPs could freely participate. They 
aimed at preventing the traditional left-right confrontation from 
entering into the new party by allowing only those who could 
share new parties' values and policies to join. On the other hand， 
the left claimed a transformation of the party as a whole. This 
was what exactly the right wanted to block. The right fe呂red
that the left became a barrier for the new party Lo promote 
widely ranging citizens' participation over the issues of 
protection， welfare provision， and environmental 
the to 
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consumer 
problems. 
On January 19， 1996 at the Party Congress， the JSP 
unanimously agreed to change the party name to the Social 
Democratic Party. Since the birth of Shinminshurengo in August 
1994， the project of making a new party fluctuated from left to 
right， but in the end， itfailed and they ended up by merely 
repainting the signboard. 1n fact， the procεss toward this change 
of party name was not at al different from traditional in.party 
conflicts among factions. Behind the Murayama group and the 
anti-Murayama group， the LDP and Shinshinto existed 
respectively. The former wanted to maintain the LDP-JSP 
coalition government， while the latter wished to get the anti-LDP 
coalition government back. These two groups insinuated 
themselves into the JSP's internal conflicts and played a game of 
tug of war. (109) 
Conclusion 
Since 1989， the JSP has not been able to resume its power 
because it failed to utilize two crucial opportunities: the Doi 
boom and the overwhelming victory in the 1989 election， and its 
participation in the coalition government in 1993. If compared to 
the Italian case in which the center-left government Ied by the 
PDS boldly promoted drastic institutional reforms including not 
only political-economic reforms but also Constitutional reform， 
the JSP clearly lacked energy. Even one takes into account that 
the leftist victory in the Italy's 1996 elections was brought 
about， not by radicalization of ltalian society as a whole， but by 
a purely strategic success in coalition building， itis possible to 
say that the PDS won by showing its strong leadership. 
One factor to explain the JSP's lack of energy is that Italian 
civil society is stronger than that of Japan. In addition， the 
Italian intellectual culture is much more profound than that of 
Japan， and so the structure of Japan's corporate society， which 
has hindered individuals' autonomy， not only produced the 
conservatization of unions' movements but also prevented the 
development of public space and concepts of social and economic 
equity that would yield Social Democracy and citizen-oriented 
liberalism. 
It is certainly understandable that the JSP lacked energy in 
such a circumstance. Today new energy is born outside the JSP / 
SDP. The entity that advocated a bold reform of Japan's almost 
authoritarian bureaucracy and that was planning to call itself 
“Democratic Party" may well realize some parts of democracy 
and respond to citizens' demands. It is not assured， however， 
that this rather centrist entity will fil the vacuum of economic 
democracy caused by the absence of West-European Social 
??????
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